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Tackling the Question of Legitimacy in Transitional Justice: Steve Biko and
the Post-Apartheid Reconciliation Process in South Africa
Abstract
This thesis seeks to determine and understand the impact of the Steve Biko case on the effectiveness of the
post-apartheid reconciliation process in South Africa. The Biko case in an example of a highly visible challenge
to the South African government’s chosen method of post-apartheid reconciliation, as Biko’s own family did
not believe in the process and fought elements of it from its inception.
Steve Biko was a noted anti-apartheid activist who founded the Black Consciousness movement, which
advocated for black South Africans to be proud of their blackness. Biko died mysteriously and suddenly in
police custody in 1977. The apartheid government conducted an inquest into his death but found no evidence
of wrongdoing or criminal activity. After the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, the new government of
South Africa negotiated the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to attempt to mend the wounds of
both white and black South Africans during apartheid, avoiding typical Nuremberg-style trials. However, this
unique method of restorative justice, which would provide amnesty to human rights violators who divulged
the whole truth of their crimes and could demonstrate that they acted for political motives, greatly upset
Biko’s family. His family members desired prosecutions of the apartheid police involved in Biko’s death, and
they challenged the constitutionality of amnesty, with the support of Black Consciousness group AZAPO and
other victims’ families, to the newly formed Constitutional Court of South Africa. However, they lost their
case, and soon thereafter had to face five apartheid police officers’ applications and hearings for amnesty in the
death of Biko. In the end, all five officers were denied amnesty, yet there was not sufficient evidence to
subsequently prosecute them for their crimes.
After detailing and analyzing the handling of the Biko case, while also discussing the truth versus justice
dilemma in the pursuit of peace through transitional justice in divided societies, I will argue that the Biko case
actually reinforced the legitimacy of the entire reconciliation process in South Africa, even though Biko’s
family members lost their case against the government and did not see Biko’s killers prosecuted.
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ABSTRACT	  
	  	   This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  determine	  and	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  case	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  post-­‐apartheid	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  The	  Biko	  case	  in	  an	  example	  of	  a	  highly	  visible	  challenge	  to	  the	  South	  African	  government’s	  chosen	  method	  of	  post-­‐apartheid	  reconciliation,	  as	  Biko’s	  own	  family	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  process	  and	  fought	  elements	  of	  it	  from	  its	  inception.	  	  	  	  	  Steve	  Biko	  was	  a	  noted	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activist	  who	  founded	  the	  Black	  Consciousness	  movement,	  which	  advocated	  for	  black	  South	  Africans	  to	  be	  proud	  of	  their	  blackness.	  	  Biko	  died	  mysteriously	  and	  suddenly	  in	  police	  custody	  in	  1977.	  	  The	  apartheid	  government	  conducted	  an	  inquest	  into	  his	  death	  but	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  wrongdoing	  or	  criminal	  activity.	  	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  apartheid	  regime	  in	  1994,	  the	  new	  government	  of	  South	  Africa	  negotiated	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (TRC)	  to	  attempt	  to	  mend	  the	  wounds	  of	  both	  white	  and	  black	  South	  Africans	  during	  apartheid,	  avoiding	  typical	  Nuremberg-­‐style	  trials.	  	  However,	  this	  unique	  method	  of	  restorative	  justice,	  which	  would	  provide	  amnesty	  to	  human	  rights	  violators	  who	  divulged	  the	  whole	  truth	  of	  their	  crimes	  and	  could	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  acted	  for	  political	  motives,	  greatly	  upset	  Biko’s	  family.	  	  His	  family	  members	  desired	  prosecutions	  of	  the	  apartheid	  police	  involved	  in	  Biko’s	  death,	  and	  they	  challenged	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  amnesty,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  Black	  Consciousness	  group	  AZAPO	  and	  other	  victims’	  families,	  to	  the	  newly	  formed	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa.	  	  However,	  they	  lost	  their	  case,	  and	  soon	  thereafter	  had	  to	  face	  five	  apartheid	  police	  officers’	  applications	  and	  hearings	  for	  amnesty	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  all	  five	  officers	  were	  denied	  amnesty,	  yet	  there	  was	  not	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  subsequently	  prosecute	  them	  for	  their	  crimes.	  	  	  After	  detailing	  and	  analyzing	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  Biko	  case,	  while	  also	  discussing	  the	  truth	  versus	  justice	  dilemma	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  peace	  through	  transitional	  justice	  in	  divided	  societies,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  Biko	  case	  actually	  reinforced	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  entire	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa,	  even	  though	  Biko’s	  family	  members	  lost	  their	  case	  against	  the	  government	  and	  did	  not	  see	  Biko’s	  killers	  prosecuted.	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  	   In	  1980,	  British	  musician	  Peter	  Gabriel	  released	  the	  song	  “Biko,”	  to	  protest	  the	  death	  of	  noted	  South	  African	  activist	  Stephen	  Bantu	  Biko.	  	  He	  sang:	  	  	  	  	  
“Oh	  Biko,	  Biko,	  because	  Biko	  
Yihla	  Moja,	  Yihla	  Moja	  (Come	  Spirit)	  
The	  man	  is	  dead	  
And	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world	  are	  watching	  now.”	  Released	  only	  three	  years	  after	  Biko’s	  suspicious	  and	  unexpected	  death	  while	  in	  police	  custody,	  the	  song	  quickly	  rose	  on	  the	  Billboard	  charts,	  and	  Gabriel	  began	  closing	  out	  his	  concerts	  with	  this	  somber	  song.	  	  The	  line,	  “…the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world	  are	  watching	  now,”	  rang	  true,	  as	  the	  Biko	  case	  gained	  a	  strong	  international	  following.	  	  It	  was	  later	  revealed	  through	  autopsy	  and	  officer	  testimony	  that	  Biko	  was	  tortured,	  chained	  for	  24	  hours,	  denied	  medical	  attention,	  and	  then	  later	  driven	  naked	  and	  bleeding	  to	  a	  Pretoria	  prison	  with	  a	  hospital,	  where	  he	  died	  upon	  arrival	  of	  traumatic	  brain	  injuries.1	  	  His	  family	  began	  a	  long	  and	  arduous	  legal	  battle	  for	  justice	  that	  began	  with	  an	  inquest	  in	  the	  1970s,	  a	  case	  against	  the	  government,	  amnesty	  hearings	  at	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (TRC)	  in	  the	  1990s,	  and	  a	  push	  for	  a	  prosecution	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  
Significance	  	  	   In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  seek	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  “What	  impact	  did	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  case	  have	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa?”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  "No	  Trial	  of	  Police	  in	  Biko	  Case."	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  October	  8,	  2003.	  Accessed	  December	  1,	  2014.	  http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/08/world/fg-­‐safrica8.	  	  
	  	   	   2	  	  The	  Biko	  case	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  challenge	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission,	  as	  his	  family	  opposed	  the	  TRC’s	  amnesty	  provision	  and	  challenged	  the	  South	  African	  government	  over	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  amnesty	  in	  the	  commission.	  	  However,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  usually	  ends	  here;	  this	  thesis	  will	  delve	  deeper	  into	  Biko’s	  case	  to	  determine	  what	  impact,	  if	  any,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	  subsequent	  TRC	  amnesty	  hearings	  had	  on	  the	  greater	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  Biko	  case	  in	  South	  Africa	  during	  the	  democratic	  transition	  (even	  though	  it	  was	  unsatisfactory	  to	  the	  Biko	  family)	  actually	  strengthened	  the	  reconciliation	  process,	  giving	  it	  the	  legitimacy	  it	  needed	  to	  continue	  on	  relatively	  peacefully.	  	  	  	  This	  guiding	  question	  is	  important	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  better	  understand	  truth	  commissions	  and	  transitional	  justice.	  	  Other	  countries,	  primarily	  in	  Latin	  America,	  have	  used	  truth	  commissions	  after	  conflicts,	  and	  they	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  used	  again	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Thus,	  a	  further	  analysis	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  South	  African	  TRC	  process	  will	  add	  to	  future	  transitional	  justice	  initiatives	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  restorative	  justice.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  also	  add	  to	  the	  scholarship	  surrounding	  to	  what	  extent	  truth	  commissions	  are	  legitimate,	  and	  particularly	  how	  they	  maintain	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  high	  profile	  opposition	  to	  their	  very	  existence.	  	  Here,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  case	  in	  detail,	  as	  it	  is	  critical	  case	  in	  the	  transitional	  justice	  history	  of	  South	  Africa.	  	  It	  provides	  a	  conspicuous	  opposition	  to	  the	  reconciliation	  process.	  	  Through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  case	  opposition	  to	  the	  TRC	  in	  South	  Africa,	  we	  can	  identify	  and	  further	  analyze	  the	  politics	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  TRC	  not	  only	  in	  South	  
	  	   	   3	  	  Africa	  but	  also	  in	  other	  countries	  that	  may	  choose	  to	  use	  truth	  commissions	  in	  resolving	  conflicts.	  
Theoretical	  Contribution	  	  	   This	  thesis	  will	  help	  inform	  theory	  about	  reconciliation.	  	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Biko	  case’s	  process	  in	  the	  TRC	  will	  add	  to	  the	  scholarship	  surrounding	  the	  debate	  of	  truth	  versus	  justice	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  peace,	  whereby	  the	  prevailing	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  pursuance	  of	  one	  automatically	  leads	  to	  an	  abandonment	  of	  the	  other.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  show	  that	  this	  tension	  between	  peace,	  truth,	  and	  justice	  is	  not	  always	  so	  clear-­‐cut,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  strong	  merits	  to	  truth	  commissions	  along	  with	  important	  caveats.	  	  Importantly,	  I	  will	  also	  discuss	  how	  the	  TRC	  was	  a	  political	  compromise	  between	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC)	  and	  the	  apartheid	  National	  Party	  (NP),	  showing	  that	  since	  truth	  commissions	  are	  typically	  compromises	  from	  their	  inception,	  the	  process	  already	  starts	  with	  a	  blurred	  line	  between	  peace	  and	  justice.	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  theoretical	  contribution,	  this	  study	  provides	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  factors	  affecting	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  TRC	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  it	  could	  inform	  future	  policy	  regarding	  transitional	  justice.	  	  
	  
LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
	   After	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations,	  many	  countries	  employ	  a	  type	  of	  transitional	  justice	  under	  the	  new,	  typically	  democratic	  government.	  	  According	  to	  Joanna	  Quinn,	  transitional	  justice	  “focuses	  specifically	  on	  reforms	  to	  the	  justice	  sector,	  working	  toward	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  assisting	  in	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  the	  system	  of	  courts	  that	  is	  required	  in	  a	  functioning,	  democratic	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  society.”2	  	  Although	  transitional	  justice	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  development	  in	  governance,	  whereas	  most	  human	  rights	  abusers	  get	  away	  with	  their	  crimes,	  many	  scholars	  and	  government	  officials	  debate	  the	  best	  way	  to	  ensure	  justice.	  	  Martha	  Minow	  developed	  three	  paradigms	  of	  transitional	  justice	  that	  most	  scholars	  accept:	  retributive,	  restorative,	  and	  reparative	  justice.3	  	   Retributive	  justice	  relies	  primarily	  on	  trials	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  prosecuting	  and	  punishing	  human	  rights	  violators.4	  	  By	  serving	  as	  an	  example	  to	  others,	  retributive	  justice	  aims	  to	  deter	  future	  crime.	  	  Reparative	  justice	  consists	  of	  retribution	  and	  apology	  to	  help	  heal	  the	  injuries	  of	  victims	  from	  human	  rights	  violations.5	  	  Finally,	  restorative	  justice,	  which	  is	  becoming	  a	  popular	  alternative	  to	  retributive	  justice,	  focuses	  on	  restoring	  the	  dignity	  of	  victims	  primarily	  through	  truth	  commissions.6	  	  Truth	  commissions	  are	  set	  up	  to	  find	  out	  the	  truth	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  during	  a	  certain	  time	  period.7	  	  Since	  1974,	  there	  have	  been	  twenty-­‐six	  truth	  commissions	  around	  the	  world,	  and	  they	  are	  a	  popular	  choice	  because	  of	  their	  focus	  on	  victims	  as	  well	  as	  their	  low	  cost,	  in	  comparison	  to	  setting	  up	  trials.8	  	  Minow	  asserts	  that	  “if	  the	  goals	  of	  repairing	  human	  dignity,	  healing	  individuals,	  and	  mending	  societies	  after	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Joanna	  Quinn,	  "Transitional	  Justice."	  In	  Human	  Rights:	  Politics	  and	  Practice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  355.	  	  3	  Martha	  Minow,	  Between	  Vengeance	  and	  Forgiveness	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1998).	  4	  Ibid,121.	  5	  Joanna	  Quinn,	  "Transitional	  Justice."	  In	  Human	  Rights:	  Politics	  and	  Practice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  356.	  6	  Ibid.	  7	  Ibid,	  360.	  8	  Ibid.	  
	  	   	   5	  	  the	  trauma	  of	  mass	  atrocity	  are	  central,	  truth	  commissions	  offer	  features	  that	  are	  often	  more	  promising	  that	  prosecutions.”9	  	  	  	   There	  is	  an	  extensive	  body	  of	  literature	  about	  restorative	  justice,	  and	  many	  debates	  about	  whether	  retributive	  or	  restorative	  justice	  is	  the	  best	  for	  a	  transitioning	  society.	  	  While	  there	  is	  no	  universally	  agreed	  upon	  definition	  for	  restorative	  justice,	  two	  definitions	  are	  the	  most	  widely	  used.10	  	  Marshall	  defines	  it	  as	  “a	  process	  whereby	  parties	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  a	  specific	  offence	  resolve	  collectively	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  offence	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  future.”11	  	  The	  second	  most	  cited	  definition	  comes	  from	  Bazemore	  and	  Walgrave,	  who	  define	  restorative	  justice	  as,	  “every	  action	  that	  is	  primarily	  oriented	  toward	  doing	  justice	  by	  repairing	  the	  harm	  that	  has	  been	  caused	  by	  a	  crime.”12	  	  	  Historically	  and	  particularly	  in	  Western	  societies,	  after	  a	  crime	  is	  committed	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  the	  perpetrator	  rather	  than	  the	  victim.	  	  Johnstone	  asserts	  that	  the	  focus	  should	  instead	  be	  on	  the	  victim,	  and	  restorative	  justice	  “helps	  to	  heal	  the	  wounds”	  of	  a	  victim	  of	  a	  gross	  human	  rights	  violation.13	  	  He	  criticizes	  retributive	  justice	  for	  its	  “total	  neglect	  and	  disempowerment	  of	  the	  victim…which	  amounts	  to	  secondary	  victimization.”14	  	  Also,	  importantly,	  Johnstone	  discusses	  another	  “theme”	  of	  restorative	  justice,	  where	  perpetrators	  are	  treated	  humanely,	  showing	  them	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Martha	  Minow,	  "The	  Hope	  for	  Healing:	  What	  Can	  Truth	  Commissions	  Do?"	  In	  Truth	  v.	  Justice:	  The	  
Morality	  of	  Truth	  Commissions	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  236.	  10	  "Restorative	  Justice:	  The	  Real	  Story."	  In	  Restorative	  Justice:	  Critical	  Issues,	  edited	  by	  Eugene	  McLaughlin.	  (London:	  SAGE	  Publications,	  2003),	  196. 11	  Katherine	  Doolin,	  "Empowering	  Communities	  Through	  Restorative	  Justice."	  In	  Whose	  Criminal	  
Justice?:	  State	  or	  Community?	  (Hampshire:	  Waterside	  Press,	  2011),	  146.	  12	  Ibid,	  147.	  13	  Gerry	  Johnstone,	  Restorative	  Justice:	  Ideas,	  Values,	  Debates	  (Hoboken:	  Taylor	  &	  Francis,	  2011),	  11.	  14	  Ibid.	  
	  	   	   6	  	  “we	  care	  about	  them	  and	  want	  to	  reintegrate	  them	  into	  the	  community.”15	  	  By	  “othering”	  perpetrators	  and	  stripping	  them	  of	  their	  humanity,	  Johnstone	  argues	  that	  we	  push	  them	  into	  “criminal	  subcultures”	  where	  perpetrators	  become	  even	  more	  estranged	  from	  society	  and	  its	  potential	  positive,	  rehabilitative	  influence.16	  	  Johnstone	  then	  cites	  other	  proponents	  of	  restorative	  justice	  who	  argue	  that	  offenders	  only	  begin	  to	  grasp	  the	  impact	  of	  their	  actions	  if	  they	  are	  “confronted	  personally	  with	  their	  victims…hearing	  first-­‐hand	  of	  the	  actual	  harm	  caused	  by	  their	  behavior.”17	  	  The	  central	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  through	  direct	  confrontation	  between	  victim	  and	  perpetrator,	  the	  perpetrator	  experiences	  a	  sense	  of	  shame	  about	  his	  actions,	  and	  therefore	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  in	  the	  future	  to	  harm	  others.18	  	  Restorative	  justice	  also	  involves	  the	  whole	  community	  in	  the	  healing	  process	  while	  also	  limiting	  the	  constraints	  of	  legal	  definitions,	  instead	  allowing	  victims	  and	  perpetrators	  to	  speak	  and	  settle	  on	  a	  restorative	  mechanism	  such	  as	  financial	  reparations.19	  A	  common	  criticism	  of	  restorative	  justice	  is	  that	  “the	  power	  of	  restorative	  justice	  lies	  in	  its	  rhetoric	  rather	  than	  its	  outcomes.”20	  	  Clifford	  Shearing	  states	  in	  an	  interview	  about	  restorative	  justice	  that	  “people	  think	  they’ve	  made	  a	  difference	  when	  they’ve	  taught	  something;	  however	  you	  only	  make	  a	  difference	  when	  it’s	  been	  learnt,”	  and	  a	  common	  question	  issue	  with	  restorative	  justice	  is	  how	  to	  measure	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Gerry	  Johnstone,	  Restorative	  Justice:	  Ideas,	  Values,	  Debates	  (Hoboken:	  Taylor	  &	  Francis,	  2011),	  11.	  16	  Ibid.	  17	  Ibid,	  12.	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  Ibid,	  13.	  20	  Kerry	  Clamp,	  Restorative	  Justice	  in	  Transition	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2014),	  120.	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  ascertain	  whether	  a	  human	  rights	  violator	  has	  internalized	  shame	  about	  his	  actions	  or	  if	  he	  or	  she	  is	  just	  going	  through	  the	  motions	  of	  acting	  remorseful.21	  	  	  Within	  criminology,	  there	  has	  been	  much	  debate	  about	  how	  to	  define	  restorative	  justice	  and	  where	  to	  place	  it	  among	  prevailing	  theories	  of	  criminal	  justice	  and	  law.	  	  Criminologist	  John	  Braithwaite	  argues	  in	  his	  re-­‐integrative	  shaming	  theory	  that	  “disapproval	  of	  the	  [criminal]	  act	  within	  a	  continuum	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  offender,	  disapproval	  terminated	  by	  rituals	  of	  forgiveness,	  prevents	  crime,”	  more	  so	  than	  retributive	  justice.22	  	  He	  goes	  further	  to	  argue	  in	  this	  theory	  that	  “it	  is	  not	  the	  shame	  of	  police	  or	  judges	  [as	  in	  retributive	  justice]	  that	  is	  most	  able	  to	  get	  through	  to	  us…it	  is	  shame	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  we	  respect	  and	  trust,”	  which	  restorative	  justice	  ensures.23	  	  He	  also	  critiques	  retributive	  justice	  for	  “seeking	  to	  blacken	  the	  character	  of	  another”	  instead	  of	  being	  fair	  and	  “empowering	  others	  through	  process	  control”	  of	  a	  truth-­‐telling.24	  	  Perhaps	  most	  important	  to	  combat	  the	  criticism	  of	  restorative	  justice	  for	  not	  doing	  enough	  to	  deter	  future	  crime,	  Braithwaite	  claims	  that	  criminal	  trials	  by	  their	  nature	  are	  extremely	  disrespectful,	  where	  another	  human	  being	  is	  “criminally	  exploited.”25	  	  He	  quotes	  fellow	  criminologist	  Howard	  Zehr,	  writing,	  “disrespect	  begets	  disrespect,”	  and	  this	  disrespect	  can	  lead	  to	  future	  crimes	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  retribution	  for	  the	  callousness	  of	  the	  trial	  process.26	  	  Thus,	  according	  to	  Braithwaite	  and	  Zehr,	  criminal	  trials	  are	  inherently	  disrespectful	  and	  therefore	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Kerry	  Clamp,	  Restorative	  Justice	  in	  Transition	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2014),	  121.	  22	  John	  Braithwaite,	  "Restorative	  Justice:	  Theories	  and	  Worries,"	  47.	  23	  Ibid.	  24	  Ibid.	  25	  Ibid,	  50.	  26	  Ibid.	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  when	  they	  concern	  broad	  societal	  conflicts,	  they	  can	  have	  broad	  societal	  implications.	  	  	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  other	  perspectives	  on	  transitional	  justice.	  	  Professor	  Diane	  Orentlicher,	  as	  discussed	  by	  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  Derek	  Spitz,	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  for	  a	  state	  in	  transition	  to	  reconcile	  other	  than	  providing	  amnesty.27	  	  She	  argues	  the	  merits	  of	  prosecutions,	  asserting	  that	  they	  “end	  cycles	  of	  state	  violence”	  and	  actually	  move	  along	  democratic	  transitions	  by	  enforcing	  and	  encouraging	  respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  individual	  dignity	  and	  rights.28	  Importantly,	  she	  takes	  the	  issue	  of	  amnesty	  and	  situates	  it	  within	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  After	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  then	  after	  multiple	  genocides	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  international	  community	  stepped	  up	  to	  find	  an	  end	  to	  mass	  human	  rights	  violations,	  first	  with	  a	  series	  of	  ad	  hoc	  tribunals,	  and	  then	  in	  1998,	  by	  creating	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  through	  the	  Rome	  Statute,	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  200229.	  	  Through	  this	  greater	  process,	  customary	  international	  law	  developed	  that	  permits	  and	  perhaps	  even	  requires	  prosecutions	  for	  human	  rights	  violators.30	  	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  international	  criminal	  and	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  to	  deter	  future	  crimes	  by	  prosecuting	  human	  rights	  violators	  around	  the	  world.31	  	  If	  states	  allow	  indemnity	  for	  gross	  human	  rights	  abusers,	  the	  international	  community	  has	  universal	  jurisdiction	  to	  intervene,	  meaning	  that	  any	  nation’s	  domestic	  courts	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  Derek	  Spitz,	  "Memory	  and	  the	  Spectre	  of	  International	  Justice:	  A	  Comment	  on	  AZAPO"	  (South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  Rights	  13,	  no.	  2),	  277.	  28	  Ibid.	  29	  Ibid.	  30	  Ibid,	  278.	  31	  Ibid,	  280.	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  prosecute	  grave	  human	  rights	  criminals,	  even	  if	  the	  crime	  was	  committed	  elsewhere	  and	  by	  a	  foreigner.32	  	  Orentlicher	  explains	  the	  relationship	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	  law,	  and	  the	  rationale	  for	  claiming	  universal	  jurisdiction,	  as	  she	  writes:	  
“Crimes	  against	  humanity	  could	  be	  punished	  by	  an	  international	  court	  because	  the	  conduct,	  by	  its	  nature,	  offended	  humanity	  itself.	  	  Because	  the	  crime	  originated	  in	  ‘humanity’	  –	  presumably	  under	  natural	  law	  –	  its	  legal	  status	  and	  consequences	  transcended	  the	  province	  of	  municipal	  [domestic]	  law.	  	  A	  person	  who	  committed	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  was,	  like	  the	  pirate,	  hostis	  humani	  generis	  –	  ‘an	  enemy	  of	  all	  mankind’	  –	  over	  whom	  any	  state	  could	  assert	  criminal	  jurisdiction.	  	  It	  was	  a	  very	  short	  step	  from	  recognition	  of	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  as	  violation	  of	  international	  law	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  such	  crimes	  could	  be	  punished	  by	  an	  international	  court.”33	  
Therefore,	  the	  pressing	  international	  question	  becomes	  whether	  apartheid	  was	  a	  crime	  against	  humanity.	  	  If	  apartheid	  were	  labeled	  as	  such,	  this	  would	  open	  South	  Africa	  up	  to	  future	  prosecutions	  by	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court.34	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  would	  not	  be	  much	  of	  an	  argument	  for	  amnesty,	  as	  surely	  anyone	  who	  commits	  a	  crime	  against	  humanity	  cannot	  face	  indemnity	  for	  his	  or	  her	  actions.	  	  After	  citing	  Orentlicher	  to	  explain	  the	  customary	  international	  law	  potentially	  at	  play	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  choice	  of	  transitional	  justice,	  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  Derek	  Spitz,	  "Memory	  and	  the	  Spectre	  of	  International	  Justice:	  A	  Comment	  on	  AZAPO"	  (South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  Rights	  13,	  no.	  2),	  281.	  33	  Ibid,	  281.	  34	  Ibid,	  282.	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  Derek	  Spitz	  present	  a	  question	  that	  is	  still	  valid	  today:	  would	  South	  Africa	  have	  been	  better	  served	  if	  the	  international	  community	  had	  intervened	  to	  prosecute	  apartheid	  criminals?35	  	  	  Many	  scholars	  argue	  that	  this	  would	  have	  been	  impossible,	  as	  both	  apartheid	  and	  anti-­‐apartheid	  figures	  committed	  dangerous	  crimes	  worthy	  of	  prosecution.	  	  As	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid	  was	  a	  negotiated	  solution,	  not	  a	  military	  victory,	  between	  apartheid	  and	  anti-­‐apartheid	  groups,	  the	  only	  way	  forward	  was	  a	  political	  compromise	  about	  reconciliation,	  where	  the	  apartheid	  regime	  demanded	  an	  amnesty	  process.	  	  While	  this	  choice	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  just,	  perhaps	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  was	  necessary	  to	  negotiate	  an	  end	  to	  apartheid	  and	  move	  the	  country	  towards	  democracy.	  	  Boraine	  writes,	  “…in	  a	  deeply	  divided	  society	  [war	  crimes	  tribunals]	  cannot	  be	  the	  final	  word	  if	  healing	  and	  reconciliation	  are	  to	  be	  achieved…consideration	  must	  always	  be	  given	  to	  reconciliation	  so	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  process	  being	  repeated	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  diminished.”36	  This	  literature	  review	  serves	  to	  illuminate	  some	  of	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  truth	  versus	  justice,	  as	  well	  as	  peace	  versus	  justice,	  when	  choosing	  between	  restorative	  and	  retributive	  justice	  in	  divided	  places,	  such	  as	  South	  Africa.	  	  These	  debates	  are	  important	  to	  understand	  before	  analyzing	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  Biko	  case	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  reconciliation	  process,	  where	  these	  larger	  systemic	  questions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  Derek	  Spitz,	  "Memory	  and	  the	  Spectre	  of	  International	  Justice:	  A	  Comment	  on	  AZAPO"	  (South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  Rights	  13,	  no.	  2),	  282.	  36	  Alex	  Boraine,	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way”	  in	  Robert	  Rotberg	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson,	  Truth	  v.	  Justice:	  The	  Morality	  of	  Truth	  Commissions	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  147-­‐8.	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  become	  more	  tangible	  in	  courtrooms,	  hearings,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  press	  and	  in	  public	  perceptions.	  	  
	  
BACKGROUND	  AND	  HISTORICAL	  OVERVIEW	  
The	  Truth	  &	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (TRC)	  	   Following	  the	  collapse	  of	  apartheid	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  democratic	  government,	  the	  former	  apartheid	  leaders	  of	  the	  National	  Party	  (NP)	  worked	  together	  with	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC),	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  newly	  elected	  leader	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  for	  a	  new	  South	  Africa.	  	  What	  might	  have	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  miraculous	  transition	  of	  power	  from	  the	  white	  minority	  to	  the	  black	  majority	  actually	  reflected	  a	  tough	  set	  of	  political	  negotiations.	  	  Mandela’s	  government	  believed	  there	  was	  now	  a	  “compelling	  need	  to	  restore	  moral	  order,”	  but	  many	  conflicting	  political	  interests	  were	  at	  play	  between	  the	  NP	  and	  the	  ANC.37	  	  The	  former	  government	  under	  President	  F.W.	  de	  Klerk	  favored	  a	  blanket	  amnesty	  proposal,	  whereby	  all	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  other	  crimes	  under	  apartheid	  would	  be	  forgiven	  by	  the	  state.	  	  The	  ANC	  was	  staunchly	  opposed	  to	  a	  blanket	  amnesty	  provision,	  and	  instead	  many	  of	  its	  members	  pushed	  for	  Nuremberg-­‐style	  retributive	  justice,	  where	  gross	  human	  rights	  abusers	  would	  be	  put	  on	  trial.38	  	  Finally,	  de	  Klerk	  and	  Mandela	  agreed	  upon	  a	  truth	  commission	  that	  would	  have	  the	  power	  of	  granting	  individual	  amnesties,	  as	  long	  as	  violators	  could	  prove	  that	  their	  actions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Alex	  Boraine,	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way”	  in	  Robert	  Rotberg	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson,	  Truth	  v.	  Justice:	  The	  Morality	  of	  Truth	  Commissions	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  142.	  38	  Ibid,	  143.	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  were	  politically	  motivated.39	  	  However	  diplomatic	  this	  process	  may	  have	  seemed,	  Deputy	  President	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  would	  later	  reveal	  in	  a	  personal	  interview	  that	  senior	  generals	  of	  the	  apartheid	  security	  forces	  had	  threatened	  him	  with	  “dire	  consequences”	  if	  security	  force	  members	  had	  to	  face	  compulsory	  trials	  after	  the	  democratic	  transition.40	  	  	  Although	  the	  decision	  for	  a	  truth	  commission	  was	  negotiated	  among	  political	  elites,	  it	  had	  broad	  support	  among	  the	  greater	  South	  African	  population	  and	  even	  many	  foreigners.	  	  	  Professors	  and	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  planned	  conferences	  and	  published	  books	  in	  favor	  of	  restorative	  justice	  and	  a	  truth	  commission,	  such	  as	  the	  book	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past:	  Truth	  &	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  
Africa,	  which	  was	  a	  compilation	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  scholars	  and	  advocates	  from	  South	  America,	  Central	  Europe,	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  with	  reconciliation	  in	  their	  home	  countries.41	  	  In	  1995,	  the	  South	  African	  parliament	  passed	  the	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act	  34,	  which	  officially	  created	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission.42	  	  The	  TRC’s	  stated	  purpose	  was	  “not	  to	  punish	  but	  to	  help	  the	  country	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  its	  past.”43	  	  The	  Commission	  covered	  crimes	  taking	  place	  between	  March	  1960	  to	  May	  1994,	  marking	  the	  period	  between	  the	  Sharpeville	  Massacre	  and	  crimes	  committed	  by	  right-­‐wing	  Afrikaners	  surrounding	  the	  democratic	  election	  in	  April	  1994.44	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Leonard	  Thompson,	  A	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  275.	  40	  Alex	  Boraine.	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way,”	  143.	  41	  Ibid,	  144-­‐145.	  42	  Roger	  Beck,	  The	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  2000),	  197.	  43	  Ibid.	  44	  Alex	  Boraine.	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way,”	  141.	  
	  	   	   13	  	  	   As	  outlined	  in	  the	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act	  34,	  the	  TRC	  had	  four	  main	  goals:	  	  
• to	  establish	  “as	  complete	  a	  picture	  as	  possible	  of	  the	  causes,	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  gross	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  which	  were	  committed	  during	  the	  period	  from	  1	  March	  1960	  to	  the	  cut-­‐off	  date”;	  	  
• “to	  facilitate	  the	  granting	  of	  amnesty	  to	  persons	  who	  make	  full	  disclosure	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  facts	  relating	  to	  acts	  associated	  with	  a	  political	  objective”;	  	  
• “to	  establish	  and	  make	  known	  the	  fate	  or	  whereabouts	  of	  victims	  and	  by	  restoring	  the	  human	  and	  civil	  dignity	  of	  such	  victims	  by	  granting	  them	  an	  opportunity	  to	  relate	  their	  own	  accounts	  of	  the	  violations	  of	  which	  they	  are	  the	  victims,	  and	  by	  recommending	  reparation	  measures	  in	  respect	  of	  them”;	  and,	  
• “to	  compile	  a	  report	  providing	  as	  comprehensive	  an	  account	  as	  possible	  of	  the	  activities	  and	  findings	  of	  the	  Commission…	  which	  contains	  recommendations	  of	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  future	  violations	  of	  human	  rights.”45	  Although	  the	  South	  African	  TRC	  was	  modeled	  on	  past	  truth	  commissions	  in	  Chile	  and	  Argentina,	  it	  was	  unique	  in	  that	  the	  commission	  itself	  had	  the	  power	  to	  grant	  individual	  amnesties	  and	  to	  subpoena	  witnesses.46	  	  And,	  importantly,	  it	  met	  in	  public	  and	  was	  completely	  open	  to	  the	  media.47	  	  Additionally,	  if	  suspected	  gross	  human	  rights	  abusers	  did	  not	  come	  forward	  to	  tell	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  crimes,	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  "Promotion	  of	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act	  34."	  July	  19,	  1995.	  Accessed	  March	  16,	  2015.	  http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-­‐034.pdf.	  46	  Alex	  Boraine.	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way,”	  146.	  47	  Leonard	  Thompson,	  A	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  275.	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  could	  be	  prosecuted,	  which	  helped	  appease	  elites	  who	  were	  opposed	  to	  a	  complete	  lack	  of	  traditional	  retributive	  criminal	  justice	  for	  human	  rights	  violators	  and	  also	  motivated	  many	  apartheid	  police	  to	  apply	  for	  amnesty.48	  	  Additionally,	  the	  South	  African	  TRC	  was	  unique	  from	  other	  truth	  commissions	  in	  that	  it	  was	  based	  off	  of	  an	  act	  of	  parliament,	  meaning	  that	  “a	  democratically	  elected	  group	  of	  people	  participated	  in	  the	  debate	  and	  finalized	  the	  content	  of	  the	  commission,”	  while	  most	  other	  truth	  commissions	  were	  established	  by	  an	  executive	  order	  of	  that	  country’s	  president	  or	  prime	  minister.49	  	  All	  of	  these	  important	  differences	  meant	  that	  the	  South	  African	  TRC	  was	  a	  revolutionary	  combination	  of	  elements	  of	  past	  truth	  commissions	  along	  with	  new	  untested	  initiatives,	  which	  arose	  unprecedented	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  commission’s	  very	  legitimacy.	  	  The	  TRC	  was	  divided	  into	  three	  branches:	  The	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  The	  Amnesty	  Committee,	  and	  The	  Reparation	  and	  Rehabilitation	  Committee.50	  	  The	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  conducted	  public	  hearings	  for	  victims	  and	  survivors.51	  	  	  The	  Amnesty	  Committee	  heard	  amnesty	  requests,	  and	  the	  Reparation	  and	  Rehabilitation	  Committee	  was	  responsible	  for	  deciding	  and	  dispensing	  reparations	  to	  victims	  in	  both	  the	  short	  and	  long	  term.52	  	  Mandela	  chose	  17	  commissioners	  of	  the	  TRC	  from	  recommendations	  from	  nongovernmental	  organizations.53	  	  There	  were	  two	  Afrikaner	  commissioners,	  four	  English,	  two	  Indians,	  two	  Coloured,	  and	  seven	  Africans,	  with	  nine	  men	  and	  eight	  women,	  all	  coming	  from	  an	  anti-­‐apartheid	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Roger	  Beck,	  The	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  2000),	  197.	  49	  Alex	  Boraine.	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way,”	  145.	  50	  Ibid,	  145-­‐146.	  51	  Ibid.	  52	  Ibid,	  146.	  53	  Leonard	  Thompson,	  A	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  275.	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  background.54	  	  These	  commissioners	  were	  responsible	  for	  hearing	  victims’	  and	  perpetrators’	  testimonies,	  and	  some	  were	  responsible	  for	  granting	  or	  denying	  amnesty.	  	  	   The	  TRC	  process	  meant	  that	  violators	  who	  received	  amnesty	  would	  therefore	  be	  exempt	  from	  future	  criminal	  prosecution	  as	  well	  as	  from	  civil	  action.55	  	  If	  amnesty	  was	  denied,	  criminal	  prosecution	  could	  occur.	  	  In	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  amnesty,	  violators	  had	  to	  prove	  that	  there	  was	  a	  political	  motive	  behind	  their	  actions.	  	  The	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act	  34,	  Chapter	  4	  detailed	  explicitly	  how	  to	  define	  “politically	  motivated”	  actions.	  	  The	  Committee	  had	  to	  consider:	  	  “The	  motive	  of	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  act;	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  act	  took	  place;	  the	  legal	  and	  factual	  nature	  of	  the	  act	  including	  its	  gravity;	  the	  object	  or	  objective	  of	  the	  act	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  primarily	  directed	  at	  a	  political	  opponent	  or	  state	  personnel	  or	  property;	  whether	  the	  act	  was	  committed	  in	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  order	  of,	  or	  on	  behalf	  of,	  or	  with	  the	  approval	  of,	  the	  organization,	  institution,	  liberation	  movement,	  or	  body	  of	  which	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  act	  was	  a	  member,	  an	  agent,	  or	  a	  supporter;	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  act	  and	  the	  political	  objective	  pursued.”56	  	  	  Importantly,	  The	  Amnesty	  Committee	  would	  not	  grant	  amnesty	  for	  any	  act	  or	  offense	  that	  was	  for	  personal	  gain	  or	  committed	  out	  of	  malice.57	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Leonard	  Thompson,	  A	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  275.	  55	  T.	  R.	  H.	  Davenport	  and	  Christopher	  Saunders.	  South	  Africa:	  A	  Modern	  History.	  5th	  ed.	  (Hampshire:	  Macmillan	  Press,	  2000),	  693.	  56	  Alex	  Boraine.	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way,”	  148-­‐149.	  57	  Ibid,	  149.	  
	  	   	   16	  	  	   By	  the	  time	  of	  its	  final	  report	  in	  1998,	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  heard	  over	  20,000	  victims’	  testimonies	  and	  reviewed	  over	  7,000	  amnesty	  applications,	  with	  less	  than	  900	  receiving	  full	  amnesty.58	  
The	  Biko	  Case	  	   Steve	  Biko	  was	  a	  noted	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activist	  in	  South	  Africa,	  who	  is	  most	  famous	  for	  founding	  the	  Black	  Consciousness	  movement	  and	  philosophy.	  	  The	  Black	  Consciousness	  Movement	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Students’	  Organisation	  (SASO)	  and	  had	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  United	  States’	  black	  rights	  movement.	  	  Its	  members	  lauded	  the	  history	  of	  black	  Africans	  and	  sought	  to	  increase	  young	  people’s	  self	  esteem	  in	  their	  blackness.59	  	  Biko	  was	  considered	  by	  many	  to	  be	  “the	  single	  most	  important	  black	  leader	  of	  all,”	  as	  he	  was	  the	  figurehead	  of	  the	  enormous	  and	  most	  active	  student	  population.60	  	  The	  apartheid	  government	  quickly	  came	  to	  know	  Biko	  well,	  and	  he	  was	  arrested	  multiple	  times,	  where	  he	  was	  previously	  never	  physically	  harmed.	  	  The	  government	  banned	  him	  to	  his	  natal	  city	  in	  1973	  for	  his	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activism.61	  	   In	  1977,	  Steve	  Biko	  was	  arrested	  at	  a	  roadblock	  after	  he	  was	  found	  in	  violation	  of	  his	  banishment.	  	  The	  police	  arrested	  him	  under	  the	  Terrorism	  Act,	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  Roger	  Beck,	  The	  History	  of	  South	  Africa	  (Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  2000),	  197-­‐198.	  59	  "Black	  Consciousness	  Movement."	  South	  African	  History	  Online.	  Accessed	  March	  16,	  2015.	  http://www.sahistory.org.za/black-­‐consciousness-­‐and-­‐16-­‐june-­‐–-­‐birth-­‐new-­‐generation.	  60	  John	  Burns,	  "Young	  Black	  Leader	  Dies	  in	  Detention	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Raising	  Fears	  of	  New	  Unrest."	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  September	  13,	  1977.	  Accessed	  March	  16,	  2015.	  http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0912.html.	  61	  "The	  Life	  of	  Steve	  Biko."	  South	  African	  History	  Online.	  Accessed	  March	  16,	  2015.	  http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-­‐life-­‐steve-­‐biko.	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  which	  stipulated	  that	  suspects	  could	  be	  held	  indefinitely	  without	  trial.	  	  	  He	  was	  interrogated	  in	  solitary	  confinement.62	  	  Three	  weeks	  later,	  he	  was	  dead.	  	  	  Biko’s	  close	  friend	  and	  journalist	  Donald	  Woods	  responded	  to	  the	  shocking	  news	  immediately	  in	  his	  newspaper	  column,	  writing,	  “The	  basic	  facts	  are	  that	  when	  he	  was	  detained	  about	  three	  weeks	  ago	  he	  was	  fit	  and	  healthy;	  that	  he	  was	  imprisoned	  without	  trial;	  and	  that	  he	  was	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  the	  Security	  Police	  throughout	  until	  his	  death.”63	  	  Woods	  went	  further,	  and	  based	  in	  major	  part	  on	  his	  close	  relationship	  with	  Biko,	  he	  suggested	  potential	  foul	  play	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  police,	  especially	  under	  the	  well-­‐known	  brutal	  leadership	  of	  Colonel	  Pieter	  Goosen.	  	  He	  wrote,	  “I	  hold	  responsible	  all	  those	  associated	  with	  his	  detention,	  because	  his	  death	  occurred	  while	  he	  was	  under	  their	  control,	  and	  control	  exercised	  through	  morally	  wrong	  powers	  is	  morally	  unjustifiable	  control,	  making	  those	  who	  exercise	  it	  accountable	  for	  all	  that	  occurs	  in	  terms	  of	  it.”64	  	  Chief	  Gaisha	  Buthelezi	  of	  the	  Zulu	  tribe	  immediately	  also	  suspected	  foul	  play,	  stating	  that	  Biko	  had	  joined	  “the	  long	  list	  of	  those	  who	  have	  died	  for	  a	  just	  cause	  in	  South	  Africa.”65	  	   Minister	  of	  Justice	  Jimmy	  Kruger	  responded	  publicly	  that	  Biko	  had	  died	  of	  a	  hunger	  strike	  while	  in	  custody.66	  	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  Kruger	  stated	  at	  the	  Transvaal	  Congress	  of	  the	  Afrikaner	  Nationalist	  Party	  that	  Biko’s	  death	  “dit	  laat	  my	  koud	  (leaves	  me	  cold),”	  which	  infuriated	  not	  only	  many	  South	  Africans	  but	  also	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  "The	  Death	  of	  Stephen	  Biko."	  South	  Africa:	  Overcoming	  Apartheid.	  Accessed	  March	  16,	  2015.	  http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/sidebar.php?id=65-­‐258-­‐4. 63	  Donald	  Woods,	  Biko.	  3rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1991),	  210.	  64	  Ibid.	  65	  John	  Burns,	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  Detention	  in	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  Africa,	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  of	  Steve	  Biko."	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  History	  Online.	  Accessed	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  16,	  2015.	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  international	  community	  that	  began	  following	  Biko’s	  death	  because	  of	  his	  high	  profile	  position	  as	  an	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activist.67	  	  Tensions	  in	  the	  black	  community	  mounted,	  and	  Chief	  Buthelezi	  warned	  whites	  that	  he	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  control	  his	  people	  if	  they	  sought	  “an	  eye	  for	  an	  eye.”68	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  midst	  of	  extreme	  tensions	  between	  blacks	  and	  whites,	  Biko	  was	  laid	  to	  rest	  peacefully	  with	  over	  20,000	  people	  in	  attendance,	  both	  black	  and	  white.69	  	  After	  continued	  domestic	  and	  international	  pressure,	  in	  1977	  there	  was	  a	  15-­‐day	  inquest	  into	  his	  death,	  but	  a	  judge	  ruled	  that	  he	  could	  not	  charge	  the	  police	  officers	  who	  had	  detained	  Biko	  with	  murder	  as	  there	  were	  no	  eyewitnesses.70	  	  Biko’s	  family	  received	  $78,000	  compensation,	  which	  Biko’s	  widow	  called	  “blood	  money”	  and	  “an	  admission	  of	  guilt”	  by	  the	  apartheid	  government	  for	  his	  death.71	  	  She	  lamented,	  “It	  doesn’t	  bring	  the	  man	  back…The	  most	  important	  thing	  was	  the	  man’s	  life,	  not	  the	  money.”72	  	   In	  time,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  below,	  five	  police	  officers	  would	  apply	  for	  amnesty	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko	  through	  the	  TRC.	  	  The	  TRC	  denied	  them	  amnesty	  as	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  they	  lied	  on	  the	  stand,	  as	  their	  new	  description	  of	  accidentally	  killing	  Biko	  in	  self-­‐defense	  did	  not	  match	  up	  with	  Biko’s	  autopsy	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  ed.	  (New	  York:	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  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1991),	  217.	  70	  "No	  Prosecution	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  The	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  Herald,	  February	  2,	  1978.	  Accessed	  January	  7,	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  71	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  Accessed	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  report.73	  	  Biko’s	  family	  subsequently	  sought	  prosecution	  of	  the	  men	  involved,	  but	  the	  cases	  fell	  through	  in	  2003	  as	  there	  was	  “insufficient	  evidence”	  for	  a	  murder	  trial	  26	  years	  after	  the	  fact.74	  	  	  
	  
RESEARCH	  DESIGN	  The	  Steve	  Biko	  case	  stands	  as	  an	  important	  and	  visible	  challenge	  to	  the	  TRC	  process.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  provide	  a	  close	  analysis	  of	  this	  opposition.	  	  First,	  the	  thesis	  examines	  a	  high-­‐profile	  national	  court	  case	  brought	  by	  the	  Black	  Consciousness	  movement	  party	  AZAPO,	  along	  with	  the	  Biko	  family	  and	  other	  victims’	  families,	  against	  the	  government,	  arguing	  that	  the	  amnesty	  provisions	  of	  the	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act	  34	  were	  unconstitutional.	  	  Second,	  the	  project	  examines	  the	  TRC	  amnesty	  hearings	  of	  the	  five	  apartheid	  police	  involved	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko	  while	  under	  police	  custody.	  	  Then,	  this	  thesis	  analyzes	  the	  overall	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  and	  examines	  the	  enduring	  legacy	  of	  Steve	  Biko.	  	  The	  analysis	  and	  conclusion	  will	  answer	  this	  thesis’s	  analytic	  question,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Biko	  family’s	  visible	  challenge	  to	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  decided	  on	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  court	  case	  and	  the	  amnesty	  hearings,	  actually	  reinforced	  the	  peaceful	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  This	  thesis	  also	  discusses	  that	  while	  the	  Biko	  case	  reinforced	  the	  transitional	  process,	  there	  are	  lingering	  issues	  regarding	  truth,	  justice,	  peace,	  and	  reparations.	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AZAPO	  &	  OTHERS	  VS.	  PRESIDENT	  OF	  SOUTH	  AFRICA	  &	  OTHERS	  	  	  
Background	  In	  1996,	  six	  months	  following	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act	  34	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Act)	  which	  established	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission,	  the	  Azanian	  Peoples	  Organization	  (AZAPO)	  filed	  a	  court	  case	  against	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  Others	  to	  challenge	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  	  AZAPO	  was	  a	  political	  group	  formed	  from	  the	  union	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Students’	  Association	  (SASO),	  the	  Black	  Community	  Programmes,	  and	  the	  Black	  People’s	  Convention	  (BPC),	  all	  groups	  that	  had	  been	  inspired	  by	  Biko’s	  Black	  Consciousness	  Movement.75	  	  The	  case	  quickly	  gained	  national	  attention,	  as	  three	  widows	  who	  had	  lost	  their	  husbands	  to	  the	  anti-­‐apartheid	  struggle,	  including	  Steve	  Biko’s	  widow	  Ntsiki	  Biko,	  joined	  AZAPO	  as	  applicants	  in	  the	  case.76	  	  
Applicants’	  Arguments	  AZAPO’s	  attorney	  argued	  that	  Section	  20(7)	  of	  the	  Act	  violated	  Section	  22	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution,	  which	  states	  that	  “every	  person	  shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  have	  justiciable	  disputes	  settled	  by	  a	  court	  of	  law,	  or	  where	  appropriate,	  another	  independent	  or	  impartial	  forum.”77	  	  Section	  20(7)	  of	  the	  Act	  reads,	  	  “Section	  20(7)(a):	  No	  person	  who	  has	  been	  granted	  amnesty	  in	  respect	  of	  an	  act,	  omission	  or	  offence	  shall	  be	  criminally	  or	  civilly	  liable	  in	  respect	  of	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  "Azanian	  People's	  Organization	  (AZAPO)."	  South	  African	  History	  Online.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/azanian-­‐peoples-­‐organization-­‐azapo.	  76	  Christopher	  Colvin,	  "Overview	  of	  the	  Reparations	  Program	  in	  South	  Africa."	  In	  The	  Handbook	  of	  
Reparations,	  edited	  by	  Pablo	  De	  Greiff.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  184.	  77	  Ibid.	  
	  	   	   21	  	   an	  act,	  omission	  or	  offence	  and	  no	  body	  or	  organisation	  or	  the	  State	  shall	  be	  liable,	  and	  no	  person	  shall	  be	  vicariously	  liable,	  for	  any	  such	  act,	  omission	  or	  offence.	  
Section	  20(7)(c):	  neither	  the	  State	  nor	  any	  individual	  person	  or	  organisation	  can	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  the	  acts,	  omissions,	  or	  offences	  of	  any	  deceased	  person	  who	  could	  have	  qualified	  for	  amnesty.”78	  
Here,	  Section	  20(7)	  lays	  out	  that	  anyone	  who	  receives	  amnesty	  is	  exempt	  from	  all	  liability,	  which	  is	  in	  direct	  conflict	  with	  the	  Interim	  Constitution’s	  provision	  on	  ensuring	  that	  citizens	  possess	  the	  right	  to	  have	  disputes	  settled	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  	  Thus,	  this	  section	  of	  the	  Act	  strips	  citizens	  of	  this	  individual	  right	  from	  impunity.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  Act’s	  amnesty	  provision,	  according	  to	  the	  AZAPO	  counsel,	  was	  unconstitutional.	  	  The	  AZAPO	  counsel	  also	  presented	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  amnesty	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  violated	  international	  law,	  in	  particular	  the	  four	  Geneva	  Conventions	  of	  1949	  on	  the	  laws	  of	  war,	  which	  South	  Africa	  had	  signed	  and	  ratified	  in	  1952.79	  	  They	  referenced	  Article	  49	  of	  the	  first	  Geneva	  Convention,	  Article	  50	  of	  the	  second	  Geneva	  Convention,	  Article	  129	  of	  the	  third	  Geneva	  Convention,	  and	  Article	  146	  of	  the	  fourth	  Geneva	  Convention80:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Christopher	  Colvin,	  "Overview	  of	  the	  Reparations	  Program	  in	  South	  Africa."	  In	  The	  Handbook	  of	  
Reparations,	  edited	  by	  Pablo	  De	  Greiff.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  184.	  79	  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  Derek	  Spitz,	  "Memory	  and	  the	  Spectre	  of	  International	  Justice:	  A	  Comment	  on	  AZAPO"	  (South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  Rights	  13,	  no.	  2),	  270.	  80	  "AZAPO	  and	  Others	  vs.	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  Others."	  Southern	  African	  Legal	  Information	  Institute.	  July	  25,	  1996.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/16.html.	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   “Article	  49	  Amelioration	  of	  the	  Condition	  of	  the	  Wounded	  and	  Sick	  in	  Armed	  Forces	  in	  the	  Field:	  The	  High	  Contracting	  Parties	  undertake	  to	  enact	  any	  legislation	  necessary	  to	  provide	  effective	  penal	  sanctions	  for	  persons	  committing,	  or	  ordering	  to	  be	  committed,	  any	  of	  the	  grave	  breaches	  of	  the	  present	  Convention…	  
Article	  50	  Amelioration	  of	  the	  Condition	  of	  the	  Wounded,	  Sick	  and	  Shipwrecked	  Members	  of	  Armed	  Forces	  at	  Sea:	  Grave	  breaches…shall	  be…willful	  killing,	  torture	  or	  inhuman	  treatment,	  including	  biological	  experiments,	  willfully	  causing	  great	  suffering	  or	  serious	  injury	  to	  body	  or	  health,	  and	  extensive	  destruction	  and	  appropriation	  of	  property,	  not	  justified	  by	  military	  necessity	  and	  carried	  out	  unlawfully	  or	  wantonly.	  
Article	  129	  Treatment	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War:	  The	  High	  Contracting	  Parties	  undertake	  to	  enact	  any	  legislation	  necessary	  to	  provide	  penal	  sanctions	  for	  persons	  committing…grave	  breaches	  of	  the	  present	  Convention…	  
Article	  146	  Protection	  of	  Civilian	  Persons	  in	  Time	  of	  War:	  The	  High	  Contracting	  Parties	  undertake	  to	  enact	  any	  legislation	  necessary	  to	  provide	  penal	  sanctions	  for	  persons	  committing…grave	  breaches	  of	  the	  present	  Convention…”81	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81"Convention	  (I)	  for	  the	  Amelioration	  of	  the	  Condition	  of	  the	  Wounded	  and	  Sick	  in	  Armed	  Forces	  in	  the	  Field."	  ICRC:	  Treaties	  and	  State	  Parties	  to	  Such	  Treaties.	  August	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   23	  	  Therefore,	  the	  AZAPO	  counsel	  argued	  that	  South	  Africa	  had	  agreed	  to	  provide	  “penal	  sanctions”	  for	  human	  rights	  violators	  by	  signing	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions.	  	  Thus,	  any	  invocation	  of	  amnesty	  would	  directly	  contradict	  South	  Africa’s	  international	  treaty	  obligations.	  	  So,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  international	  law,	  the	  AZAPO	  counsel	  argued	  that	  the	  Act’s	  amnesty	  provision	  was	  illegal.	  	  	   The	  applicants’	  arguments	  to	  the	  Court	  were	  thus	  twofold.	  	  They	  claimed	  that	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Interim	  Constitution	  and	  that	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  was	  illegal	  under	  international	  law.	  
Respondents’	  Defense	  The	  state’s	  defense	  was	  that	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution,	  which	  called	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  act	  of	  government	  to	  foster	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  country,	  was	  an	  equal	  part	  of	  the	  constitution.82	  	  Thus,	  the	  South	  African	  government	  was	  compelled	  by	  the	  constitution	  to	  create	  the	  Act.83	  	  Given	  this	  constitutional	  mandate,	  the	  Act’s	  amnesty	  provision	  was	  therefore	  authorized	  by	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  and	  was	  indeed	  constitutional.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  After	  almost	  two	  months,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  reached	  its	  final	  decision,	  written	  by	  Deputy	  President	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  Ismail	  Mahomed.	  	  The	  Court	  recognized	  the	  pain	  behind	  the	  applicants’	  court	  case,	  yet	  it	  upheld	  that	  the	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  "AZAPO	  and	  Others	  vs.	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  Others."	  Southern	  African	  Legal	  Information	  Institute.	  July	  25,	  1996.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/16.html.	  83	  Ibid.	  
	  	   	   24	  	  legislature	  had	  not	  exceeded	  its	  powers	  in	  adopting	  Section	  20	  of	  the	  Act.84	  	  After	  establishing	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  as	  legal,	  Mahomed	  DP	  presented	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  in	  several	  separate	  headings:	  “amnesty	  in	  respect	  of	  criminal	  liability,	  amnesty	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  civil	  liability	  of	  individual	  wrongdoers,	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  amnesty	  on	  any	  potential	  civil	  liability	  of	  the	  state.”85	  
Establishing	  Legality	  of	  Amnesty	  Provision	  	  Mahomed	  DP	  begins	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  with	  a	  quick	  overview	  of	  apartheid	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  notes	  that	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  was	  written	  out	  of	  a	  shared	  realization	  that	  the	  nation	  could	  only	  survive	  through	  “a	  generous	  commitment	  to	  reconciliation	  and	  national	  unity.”86	  	  He	  cites	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution,	  which	  describes	  the	  constitution	  as	  a	  “historic	  bridge”	  between	  the	  country’s	  past	  and	  future,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “need	  for	  reparation	  but	  not	  for	  retaliation,	  a	  need	  for	  ubuntu	  [universal	  bond	  of	  shared	  humanity]	  but	  not	  for	  victimization.”87	  	  The	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  also	  states:	  
“In	  order	  to	  advance	  such	  reconciliation	  and	  reconstruction,	  amnesty	  shall	  be	  granted	  in	  respect	  of	  acts,	  omissions	  and	  offences	  associated	  with	  political	  objectives	  and	  committed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  conflicts	  of	  the	  past.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  Parliament	  under	  this	  Constitution	  shall	  adopt	  a	  law	  determining	  a	  firm	  cut-­‐off	  date,	  which	  shall	  be	  a	  date	  after	  8	  October	  1990	  and	  before	  6	  December	  1993,	  and	  providing	  for	  the	  mechanisms,	  criteria	  and	  procedures,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Justice	  Ismail	  Mahomed.	  "Amnesty,	  Reconciliation,	  and	  UBuntu:	  The	  AZAPO	  Case	  Decision	  Transcript."	  In	  Ubuntu	  and	  the	  Law:	  African	  Ideals	  and	  Postapartheid	  Jurisprudence,	  edited	  by	  Drucilla	  Cornell	  and	  Nyoko	  Muvangua.	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  104.	  85	  Ibid.	  	  86	  Ibid,	  105.	  87	  Ibid.	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   including	  tribunals,	  if	  any,	  through	  which	  such	  amnesty	  shall	  be	  dealt	  with	  at	  any	  time	  after	  the	  law	  has	  been	  passed.”88	  
Using	  this	  paragraph	  of	  the	  epilogue,	  Mahomed	  DP	  details	  how	  the	  Act	  of	  1995	  was	  then	  created	  to	  establish	  the	  TRC	  and	  begin	  the	  country’s	  path	  to	  reconciliation.	  	  He	  then	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  applicants’	  argument	  that	  Section	  20(7)	  of	  the	  Act	  violates	  Section	  22	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  giving	  individuals	  the	  right	  to	  have	  disputes	  settled	  by	  impartial	  forum	  makes	  logical	  sense,	  it	  does	  not	  hold,	  as	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution,	  which	  grants	  the	  Act’s	  amnesty	  provisions,	  is	  indeed	  on	  equal	  footing	  with	  Section	  22	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution.	  	  He	  goes	  one	  step	  further	  and	  argues	  that	  Parliament	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  create	  the	  Act	  and	  provide	  amnesty,	  as	  he	  writes:	  
“What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  Parliament	  not	  only	  has	  the	  authority	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  epilogue	  to	  make	  a	  law	  providing	  for	  amnesty	  to	  be	  granted	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  acts,	  omissions	  and	  offences	  falling	  within	  the	  category	  defined	  therein	  but	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  obliged	  to	  do	  so.	  	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  wording	  in	  the	  material	  part	  of	  the	  epilogue	  which	  is	  that	  ‘Parliament	  under	  this	  Constitution	  shall	  adopt	  a	  law’	  providing	  inter	  alia,	  for	  the	  ‘mechanisms,	  criteria	  and	  procedures…through	  which…amnesty	  shall	  be	  dealt	  with.”89	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  Thus,	  Mahomed	  DP	  establishes	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  as	  equal	  to	  any	  section	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  thus	  argues	  that	  Parliament	  had	  to	  write	  and	  pass	  a	  law	  ensuring	  reconciliation	  through	  amnesty,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  Act.	  	   In	  establishing	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  as	  equally	  legal	  and	  enforceable	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  constitution,	  Mahomed	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Court	  helped	  create	  a	  critical	  foundation	  of	  South	  African	  jurisprudence.	  	  This	  crucial	  decision,	  upon	  which	  the	  Court’s	  defense	  rested	  as	  it	  made	  reconciliation	  a	  central	  goal	  of	  the	  government,	  created	  a	  legal	  debate	  that	  exists	  even	  today.	  	  	  
Amnesty	  &	  Criminal	  Liability	  	  Next,	  Mahomed	  DP	  argues	  that	  amnesty	  for	  criminal	  liability	  is	  necessary	  to	  discover	  the	  truth	  of	  past	  crimes.	  	  He	  argues	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  evidence	  in	  many	  instances	  to	  even	  bring	  up	  charges	  against	  individuals	  and	  thus	  the	  Act	  and	  its	  amnesty	  provision	  are	  necessary	  for	  reconciliation.	  	  He	  writes,	  	  
“The	  Act	  seeks	  to	  address	  this	  massive	  problem	  [not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  open	  criminal	  cases]	  by	  encouraging	  these	  survivors	  and	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  tortured	  and	  the	  wounded,	  the	  maimed	  and	  the	  dead	  to	  unburden	  their	  grief	  publicly,	  to	  receive	  the	  collective	  recognition	  of	  a	  new	  nation	  that	  they	  were	  wronged,	  and	  crucially,	  to	  help	  them	  to	  discover	  what	  did	  in	  truth	  happen	  to	  their	  loved	  ones,	  where	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  did	  it	  happen,	  and	  who	  was	  responsible.”90	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Justice	  Ismail	  Mahomed.	  "Amnesty,	  Reconciliation,	  and	  UBuntu:	  The	  AZAPO	  Case	  Decision	  Transcript."	  In	  Ubuntu	  and	  the	  Law:	  African	  Ideals	  and	  Postapartheid	  Jurisprudence,	  edited	  by	  Drucilla	  Cornell	  and	  Nyoko	  Muvangua.	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  113.	  
	  	   	   27	  	  He	  argues	  further	  that	  the	  incentive	  of	  amnesty	  is	  necessary	  to	  encourage	  those	  with	  information	  to	  come	  forward.	  	  He	  remarks	  on	  the	  healing	  power	  of	  finding	  out	  the	  truth	  through	  amnesty	  from	  criminal	  liability,	  stating,	  	  
“The	  families	  of	  those	  unlawfully	  tortured,	  maimed	  or	  traumatised	  become	  more	  empowered	  to	  discover	  the	  truth,	  the	  perpetrators	  become	  exposed	  to	  opportunities	  to	  obtain	  relief	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  guilt	  or	  an	  anxiety	  they	  might	  be	  living	  with	  for	  many	  long	  years,	  the	  country	  begins	  the	  long	  and	  necessary	  process	  of	  healing	  the	  wounds	  of	  the	  past,	  transforming	  anger	  and	  grief	  into	  a	  mature	  understanding	  and	  creating	  the	  emotional	  and	  structural	  climate	  essential	  for	  ‘reconciliation	  and	  reconstruction’	  which	  informs	  the	  very	  difficult	  and	  sometimes	  painful	  objectives	  of	  the	  amnesty	  articulated	  in	  the	  epilogue	  [of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution].”91	  
Mahomed	  DP	  argues	  that	  without	  amnesty	  from	  criminal	  liability,	  victims’	  families	  will	  never	  learn	  the	  truth	  about	  their	  loved	  ones	  and	  there	  will	  not	  be	  enough	  evidence	  to	  open	  criminal	  cases.	  	  Additionally,	  perpetrators	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  will	  remain	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  society,	  filled	  with	  guilt	  and	  uncertainty.	  	  Through	  amnesty,	  he	  argues	  that	  both	  abusers	  and	  victims	  will	  walk	  on	  the	  “historic	  bridge”	  provided	  by	  the	  constitution	  to	  a	  new,	  healed	  South	  Africa.92	  	  	   Here,	  the	  Court	  presents	  a	  strong	  favor	  for	  restorative	  justice,	  yet	  does	  not	  consider	  citizens’	  individual	  rights,	  which	  include	  seeking	  justice	  through	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  retributive	  justice.	  	  Defending	  amnesty	  also	  raises	  important	  questions	  about	  impunity	  and	  whether	  victims	  should	  have	  their	  choice	  of	  justice	  against	  perpetrators.	  	  
Amnesty	  &	  Civil	  Liability	  	  The	  applicants	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  the	  court	  upheld	  amnesty	  for	  criminal	  liability,	  it	  should	  not	  and	  could	  not	  also	  grant	  amnesty	  for	  civil	  liability.	  	  Mahomed	  DP	  counters	  this	  claim,	  arguing	  that	  he	  does	  not	  see	  anything	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  that	  would	  grant	  amnesty	  from	  criminal	  prosecution	  yet	  would	  not	  grant	  the	  same	  for	  civil	  damages.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  words	  “acts	  and	  omissions”	  in	  addition	  to	  “offences”	  in	  the	  epilogue	  shows	  that	  amnesty	  expands	  beyond	  solely	  criminal	  liability.93	  	  	  	  
Amnesty	  &	  the	  State’s	  Civil	  Liability	  	  Mahomed	  DP	  argues	  that	  Parliament	  had	  the	  right	  to	  give	  the	  state	  amnesty	  from	  civil	  damages,	  as	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  was	  purposefully	  open-­‐ended	  in	  what	  forms	  of	  amnesty	  Parliament	  could	  choose.	  	  He	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  would	  have	  a	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  time	  of	  repaying	  all	  of	  those	  who	  were	  hurt	  by	  agents	  of	  the	  apartheid	  state.	  	  	  
Response	  to	  International	  Law	  &	  Geneva	  Argument	  	  The	  court	  rejected	  the	  plaintiffs’	  argument	  that	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act	  violated	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  on	  the	  laws	  of	  war,	  which	  “obliged	  signing	  parties	  to	  enact	  legislation	  to	  provide	  effective	  penal	  sanctions	  for	  persons	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  committing	  grave	  breaches	  of	  the	  Conventions.”94	  	  Mahomed	  DP	  asserts	  that	  this	  argument	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  a	  case	  disputing	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  Section	  20(7)	  of	  the	  Act	  and	  that	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  questioned	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  four	  cited	  Articles	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  to	  South	  Africa,	  as	  the	  Court	  defined	  the	  apartheid	  struggle	  as	  an	  internal	  conflict	  within	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  and	  thus	  not	  a	  war	  between	  two	  states.95	  	   Perhaps	  the	  most	  contentious	  argument	  in	  the	  Court’s	  majority	  decision,	  the	  debate	  about	  international	  law	  and	  amnesty	  continues	  today.	  	  By	  allowing	  amnesty	  for	  egregious	  human	  rights	  abusers,	  some	  scholars,	  as	  discussed	  by	  Braude	  and	  Spitz,	  still	  claim	  that	  the	  South	  African	  government	  violated	  its	  international	  treaty	  obligations	  (specifically	  under	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions)	  and	  sanctioned	  impunity	  for	  world	  criminals.96	  	  However,	  this	  argument	  raises	  the	  question	  about	  whether	  apartheid	  was	  a	  domestic	  issue	  or	  a	  crime	  against	  humanity.97	  	  If	  categorized	  as	  a	  crime	  against	  humanity,	  the	  international	  community	  would	  have	  universal	  jurisdiction	  over	  apartheid	  criminals,	  yet	  international	  law	  continues	  to	  be	  inconsistently	  enforced.	  	  Opening	  South	  Africa	  up	  to	  international	  prosecution	  may	  have	  caused	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  
Mahomed	  DP’s	  Conclusion	  	  Mahomed	  DP	  argues	  that	  Parliament	  was	  entitled	  to	  create	  the	  Act	  as	  it	  did	  and	  that	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  authorizes	  amnesty.	  	  In	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  implementing	  amnesty,	  Parliament	  had	  many	  choices,	  as	  the	  epilogue	  left	  amnesty	  provision	  open	  and	  vague.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  “the	  exercise	  of	  that	  choice	  does	  not,	  in	  my	  view,	  impact	  on	  its	  constitutionality.”98	  	  He	  concludes	  that	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  authorizes	  Section	  20(7)	  of	  the	  Act,	  and	  thus	  the	  applicants’	  case	  fails.	  
Concurring	  Opinion	  from	  Judge	  Didcott	  	  Fellow	  Constitutional	  Court	  judge	  Judge	  Didcott	  wrote	  a	  separate	  but	  concurring	  judgment	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  “opening	  the	  state	  up	  to	  a	  long	  process	  of	  civil	  actions	  that	  could	  run	  for	  many	  years	  with	  great	  (probably	  negative)	  publicity	  would	  not	  further	  the	  broad	  aims	  of	  reconciliation	  as	  the	  Constitution	  required,”	  upholding	  Mahomed	  DP’s	  argument	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  reconciliation	  was	  paramount	  to	  all	  other	  concerns.99	  	  Judge	  Didcott	  also	  wrote	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  amnesty	  to	  bring	  the	  truth	  to	  light:	  “The	  amnesties	  made	  available	  to	  individuals	  are	  indispensable	  if	  an	  essential	  object	  of	  the	  legislation	  is	  to	  be	  achieved,	  the	  object	  of	  eliciting	  the	  truth	  about	  atrocities	  committed	  in	  the	  past	  and	  the	  responsibility	  borne	  for	  them...The	  emergence	  of	  truth,	  or	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  that	  at	  any	  rate,	  depends	  after	  all	  on	  no	  fear	  of	  the	  consequences	  continuing	  to	  daunt	  them	  from	  telling	  it,	  on	  their	  encouragement	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  amnesties	  to	  reveal	  it	  instead.	  	  The	  shroud	  of	  silence	  that	  has	  enveloped	  their	  activities	  for	  too	  long	  would	  otherwise	  go	  on	  doing	  so.	  	  And	  that	  would	  have	  put	  paid	  to	  the	  bulk	  of	  legal	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  Justice	  Ismail	  Mahomed.	  "Amnesty,	  Reconciliation,	  and	  UBuntu:	  The	  AZAPO	  Case	  Decision	  Transcript."	  In	  Ubuntu	  and	  the	  Law:	  African	  Ideals	  and	  Postapartheid	  Jurisprudence,	  edited	  by	  Drucilla	  Cornell	  and	  Nyoko	  Muvangua.	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  121.	  99	  Christopher	  Colvin,	  "Overview	  of	  the	  Reparations	  Program	  in	  South	  Africa."	  In	  The	  Handbook	  of	  
Reparations,	  edited	  by	  Pablo	  De	  Greiff.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  185.	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   claims	  against	  them…had	  their	  escapes	  from	  liability	  not	  disposed	  of	  the	  lot	  in	  any	  event.	  	  For	  enough	  evidence	  to	  substantiate	  the	  claims	  would	  then	  seldom	  have	  come	  to	  light.”100	  While	  Didcott	  was	  proven	  correct	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Biko,	  as	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  prosecute	  the	  apartheid	  police	  implicated	  in	  his	  death,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  a	  country’s	  national	  court	  effectively	  stripped	  individuals	  of	  the	  right	  to	  prosecution	  and	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  from	  impunity,	  in	  an	  almost	  utilitarian	  belief	  that	  amnesty	  would	  be	  better	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  South	  Africa.	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  Claudia	  Braude	  and	  Derek	  Spitz,	  "Memory	  and	  the	  Spectre	  of	  International	  Justice:	  A	  Comment	  on	  AZAPO"	  (South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  Rights	  13,	  no.	  2),	  271.	  101	  Albie	  Sachs,	  "War,	  Violence,	  Human	  Rights,	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  Overlap	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  (2004),	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TRC	  AMNESTY	  HEARINGS	  
Officers	  Apply	  for	  Amnesty	  	  	  Only	  a	  few	  months	  after	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  upheld	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act	  establishing	  the	  TRC,	  five	  apartheid	  policemen,	  Gideon	  Nieuwoudt,	  Harold	  Snyman,	  Daantjie	  Siebert,	  Ruben	  Marx,	  and	  Johan	  Beneke	  applied	  for	  amnesty	  in	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko	  while	  in	  police	  custody.102	  	  Biko’s	  family	  was	  upset	  by	  the	  news,	  and	  Biko’s	  oldest	  son	  told	  the	  press,	  “My	  impression	  is	  that	  the	  police	  took	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  knock	  the	  living	  daylights	  out	  of	  Steve.	  	  That	  is	  a	  criminal,	  not	  a	  political	  crime.	  	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  convinced	  they	  are	  motivated	  by	  reconciliation.”103	  	  Deputy	  chairman	  of	  the	  TRC	  told	  the	  press	  that	  after	  two	  decades	  of	  no	  new	  evidence	  regarding	  Biko’s	  death,	  this	  public	  amnesty	  hearing	  “may	  be	  the	  last	  chance	  to	  learn	  the	  truth.”104	  Biko’s	  family	  was	  now	  faced	  with	  the	  one	  result	  they	  most	  opposed	  –	  Biko’s	  killers	  seeking	  amnesty.	  	  To	  understand	  the	  surprise	  many	  felt	  at	  the	  five	  officers	  applying	  for	  amnesty	  after	  previously	  claiming	  they	  were	  not	  involved	  in	  Biko’s	  death,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  1977	  inquest.	  	  	  
Background:	  1977	  Inquest	  	   Two	  months	  after	  Biko’s	  sudden	  death	  while	  in	  Port	  Elizabeth	  Security	  Police	  custody,	  public	  outcry	  led	  to	  an	  inquest.	  	  An	  inquest	  is	  an	  investigation	  into	  a	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  Darrel	  Moellendorf,	  "Amnesty,	  Truth	  and	  Justice:	  AZAPO."	  South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  
Rights	  13:	  283.	  103	  Inigo	  Gilmore,	  "Biko	  Family	  to	  Confront	  His	  ‘killers’."	  The	  Sunday	  Times	  (London),	  September	  7,	  1997.	  104	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  person’s	  death	  due	  to	  something	  other	  than	  natural	  causes.105	  	  Such	  investigations	  are	  set	  up	  primarily	  to	  unearth	  the	  truth	  and	  are	  presided	  over	  by	  a	  magistrate.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Sir	  Sydney	  Kentridge	  and	  George	  Bizos	  represented	  the	  Biko	  family,	  responding	  to	  a	  state-­‐appointed	  prosecutor.106	  	  An	  inquest	  is	  not	  a	  trial	  and	  there	  is	  no	  set	  accused	  or	  defense;	  rather,	  the	  end	  goal	  is	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  was	  any	  wrongdoing	  or	  illegal	  activity	  that	  led	  to	  the	  victim’s	  death.	  	  Even	  so,	  it	  follows	  a	  similar	  structure	  to	  a	  court	  case.	  The	  inquest	  into	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko	  lasted	  thirteen	  days,	  and	  testimony	  was	  heard	  from	  security	  police,	  doctors	  who	  examined	  Biko	  while	  in	  custody,	  as	  well	  as	  outside	  physicians	  who	  commented	  on	  the	  medical	  issues	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  case.107	  	  Throughout	  the	  weeks,	  security	  police	  consistently	  denied	  that	  they	  knew	  Biko	  had	  hurt	  his	  head,	  and	  instead	  many	  claimed	  that	  they	  thought	  he	  was	  “shamming”	  to	  avoid	  further	  interrogation.108	  	  All	  of	  the	  policemen	  who	  testified	  as	  witnesses	  denied	  seeing	  a	  large	  bruise	  on	  Biko’s	  head,	  and	  Sergeant	  van	  Vuuren	  claimed	  that	  Biko’s	  skin	  color	  was	  “much	  darker”	  than	  the	  photograph	  presented	  in	  court,	  therefore	  obscuring	  the	  bruise	  on	  his	  head,	  which	  was	  indicative	  of	  a	  head	  injury.109	  	  The	  policemen	  also	  justified	  their	  inhumane	  treatment	  of	  Biko	  in	  custody,	  where	  they	  kept	  him	  in	  leg	  irons	  and	  naked	  for	  months,	  claiming	  that	  it	  was	  “customary”	  to	  keep	  inmates	  chained	  and	  that	  he	  was	  denied	  clothing	  to	  prevent	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  Woods,	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  ed.	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  suicide.110	  	  Most	  importantly	  for	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  inquest,	  determining	  the	  cause	  of	  Biko’s	  death	  and	  if	  anyone	  was	  responsible,	  the	  policemen	  testified	  that	  Biko	  had	  become	  violent	  during	  an	  interrogation	  that	  led	  to	  a	  “scuffle”	  with	  five	  officers.	  	  It	  was	  probable,	  but	  not	  confirmed,	  that	  Biko	  could	  have	  hurt	  his	  head	  during	  the	  altercation.	  	  Donald	  Woods	  describes	  Major	  Snyman’s	  recollection	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  interrogation	  room	  619	  in	  early	  September:	  “Major	  Snyman	  said	  that	  shortly	  after	  Mr.	  Biko	  had	  his	  leg	  irons	  and	  handcuffs	  removed,	  and	  was	  offered	  a	  chair	  to	  sit	  on,	  he	  got	  a	  wild	  expression	  in	  his	  eyes	  suddenly	  and	  jumped	  off	  the	  chair.	  	  Mr.	  Biko	  threw	  the	  chair	  at	  Major	  Snyman,	  but	  he	  jumped	  out	  of	  the	  way.	  	  After	  this,	  Mr.	  Biko	  charged	  at	  Warrant	  Officer	  J.	  Beneke,	  lashed	  out	  wildly	  at	  him	  and	  pinned	  him	  against	  a	  steel	  cabinet.	  	  Major	  Snyman	  said	  he	  and	  Captain	  Siebert	  went	  to	  Warrant	  Officer	  Beneke’s	  help.	  	  They	  tried	  to	  grab	  Mr.	  Biko,	  who	  was	  ‘clearly	  beside	  himself	  with	  fury.’...Two	  other	  members	  of	  the	  team	  came	  to	  assist.	  	  They	  overpowered	  Mr.	  Biko,	  and	  put	  handcuffs	  and	  leg	  irons	  on	  him...Mr.	  Biko	  was	  fastened	  to	  the	  grille	  in	  the	  office	  but	  continued	  to	  struggle	  against	  his	  handcuffs	  and	  leg	  irons…”111	  	  	  After	  the	  “skirmish,”	  Biko	  was	  visibly	  confused	  and	  non-­‐responsive	  to	  officers.	  	  Colonel	  Goosen,	  the	  commander	  in	  the	  prison,	  called	  in	  Dr.	  Lang	  and	  later	  Drs.	  Tucker	  and	  Hersch	  on	  separate	  visits	  who	  all	  determined	  that	  nothing	  was	  physically	  wrong	  with	  Biko.112	  	  Colonel	  Goosen	  testified	  at	  the	  inquest,	  “At	  this	  stage	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   35	  	  I	  was	  honestly	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  Mr.	  Biko	  was	  playing	  the	  fool	  with	  us	  as	  neither	  the	  district	  surgeon	  [Dr.	  Lang]	  nor	  I	  could	  detect	  any	  scars	  or	  signs	  of	  illness.”113	  	  However,	  Biko’s	  condition	  continued	  to	  deteriorate	  and	  he	  was	  eventually	  transferred	  to	  Pretoria	  in	  the	  back	  of	  a	  Land	  Rover,	  hundreds	  of	  miles	  away,	  which	  supposedly	  had	  a	  better	  medical	  facility.	  	  He	  died	  soon	  after	  arrival	  in	  his	  cell.	  	  	  	   During	  the	  inquest,	  the	  attorney	  for	  the	  Biko	  family	  Sir	  Sydney	  Kentridge	  presented	  the	  evidence	  of	  a	  lumbar	  puncture	  conducted	  on	  Biko,	  which	  showed	  red	  blood	  cells	  in	  his	  spinal	  fluid,	  which	  was	  indicative	  of	  a	  brain	  injury.	  	  Dr.	  Lang	  claimed	  he	  misreported	  the	  results,	  stating	  that	  Biko	  was	  physically	  fine,	  by	  error.114	  	  Kentridge	  then	  questioned	  Dr.	  Tucker	  and	  presented	  him	  with	  a	  hypothetical	  case	  of	  a	  child	  with	  all	  of	  the	  same	  symptoms	  as	  Biko,	  stating:	  “Let	  us	  assume	  that	  some	  holidaymakers	  from	  Pretoria	  had	  come	  to	  see	  you	  in	  Port	  Elizabeth	  about	  their	  child	  who	  had	  been	  acting	  in	  a	  bizarre	  way.	  	  The	  parents	  suspected	  that	  the	  child	  did	  not	  want	  to	  go	  back	  to	  school,	  but	  it	  showed	  a	  plantar	  reflex,	  was	  lying	  on	  the	  floor,	  had	  red	  cells	  in	  its	  spinal	  fluid,	  froth	  at	  the	  mouth,	  was	  hyperventilating	  and	  was	  weak	  in	  the	  left	  limbs.	  	  Would	  you	  have	  permitted	  his	  parents	  to	  drive	  seven-­‐hundred	  miles	  to	  Pretoria?”115	  	  	  Dr.	  Tucker	  replied	  that	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  he	  would	  have	  sent	  this	  child	  to	  the	  hospital	  immediately,	  but	  that	  there	  was	  “uncertainty”	  in	  Biko’s	  case	  and	  that	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   36	  	  Colonel	  Goosen	  was	  “averse”	  to	  sending	  Biko	  to	  a	  nearby	  public	  hospital.116	  	  However,	  everyone	  present	  at	  the	  inquest,	  including	  all	  of	  the	  doctors,	  agreed	  on	  the	  cause	  of	  Biko’s	  death:	  complications	  from	  a	  brain	  injury.117	  	  	  	   After	  a	  difficult	  thirteen	  days	  of	  hearing	  the	  evidence	  of	  various	  witnesses,	  Kentridge	  argued	  that	  the	  policemen’s	  testimonies	  did	  not	  match	  their	  affidavits,	  and	  thus	  their	  accounts	  of	  events	  were	  not	  trustworthy.	  	  He	  argued,	  “A	  firm	  and	  clear	  verdict	  may	  help	  to	  prevent	  further	  abuse	  of	  the	  system.	  	  In	  the	  light	  of	  further	  disquieting	  evidence	  for	  this	  court,	  we	  submit	  any	  verdict,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  exoneration	  of	  the	  Port	  Elizabeth	  Security	  Police	  will	  unfortunately	  be	  widely	  interpreted	  as	  a	  license	  to	  abuse	  helpless	  people	  with	  impunity.”118	  	  Mr.	  van	  Rooyen,	  representative	  of	  the	  security	  police,	  asked	  the	  magistrate	  to	  find	  that	  the	  police	  were	  not	  involved	  in	  any	  “act	  or	  omission”	  that	  caused	  Biko’s	  death.119	  	   Magistrate	  Prins	  delivered	  his	  finding	  in	  only	  80	  seconds,	  after	  being	  translated	  into	  both	  English	  and	  Afrikaans.120	  	  He	  found	  that	  Biko	  died	  on	  September	  12	  of	  a	  brain	  injury	  and	  that	  his	  head	  injury	  was	  most	  likely	  a	  result	  of	  an	  altercation	  with	  police	  officers	  on	  September	  7	  in	  an	  office	  of	  the	  security	  police.121	  	  Finally,	  he	  declared	  that,	  “on	  the	  available	  evidence	  the	  death	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  any	  act	  or	  omission	  amounting	  to	  a	  criminal	  offense	  on	  the	  part	  of	  any	  person.”122	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   37	  	   The	  verdict	  caused	  outrage	  throughout	  South	  Africa	  and	  around	  the	  world.	  	  In	  a	  speech	  in	  2011	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town,	  Sir	  Sydney	  Kentridge	  discussed	  his	  memories	  of	  the	  inquest,	  stating,	  “The	  real	  point	  was	  to	  exonerate	  policemen.	  	  None	  were	  disciplined	  or	  even	  reprimanded	  for	  Biko’s	  treatment.”123	  	  Colonel	  Goosen	  and	  Captain	  Siebert	  were	  both	  later	  promoted,	  and	  according	  to	  Kentridge,	  more	  than	  30	  people	  died	  while	  in	  security	  police	  custody	  over	  the	  next	  ten	  years.124	  The	  international	  press	  exploded	  over	  the	  inquest,	  condemning	  its	  findings.	  	  South	  African	  journalist	  Roger	  Osmond	  boldly	  wrote	  that	  the	  only	  benefit	  of	  the	  inquest	  was	  learning	  how	  the	  secretive	  security	  police	  operated:	  “We	  know	  now	  as	  we	  didn't	  know	  before	  that	  a	  detainee	  can	  be	  kept	  naked	  in	  a	  prison	  cell	  for	  three	  weeks,	  that	  he	  can	  be	  deprived	  of	  exercise,	  washing	  facilities	  and	  the	  right	  to	  buy	  food	  in	  direct	  contradiction	  of	  regulations,	  and	  that	  he	  can	  be	  kept	  handcuffed	  and	  in	  irons,	  chained	  to	  a	  grille	  for	  more	  than	  48	  hours.	  We	  know	  that	  he	  can	  be	  allowed	  to	  lie	  in	  his	  urine-­‐soaked	  trousers	  on	  urine-­‐soaked	  mats,	  while	  district	  surgeons	  don't	  even	  suggest	  a	  change	  of	  clothing,	  that	  doctors	  can	  miss	  classic	  symptoms	  of	  brain	  damage,	  that	  when	  the	  doctors	  eventually	  begin	  to	  worry	  they	  meekly	  follow	  Special	  Branch	  orders	  that	  he	  cannot	  be	  allowed	  anywhere	  near	  a	  decent	  hospital,	  that	  even	  when	  he	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  under	  observation	  for	  brain	  damage	  he	  can	  be	  moved	  from	  a	  prison	  hospital	  back	  into	  a	  police	  cell,	  that	  a	  doctor	  can	  authorise	  a	  700-­‐mile	  journey	  overnight	  without	  first	  getting	  the	  results	  of	  a	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   lumbar	  puncture,	  that	  the	  same	  doctor	  does	  not	  check	  whether	  the	  form	  of	  transport	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  promised	  by	  the	  Special	  Branch.	  	  We	  have	  also	  learned	  that	  a	  detainee	  can	  be	  sent	  naked	  on	  his	  last	  journey…[with]	  a	  couple	  of	  Special	  Branch	  men	  with	  no	  medical	  training	  as	  orderlies,	  a	  water	  container	  as	  the	  sole	  medicine,	  that	  when	  they	  reach	  Pretoria	  they	  persist	  in	  saying	  that	  the	  detainee	  is	  shamming,	  that	  no	  medical	  port	  accompanies	  the	  semi-­‐comatose	  detainee,	  that	  a	  man	  hours	  away	  from	  death	  can	  be	  given	  a	  vitamin	  injection	  and	  a	  drip	  and	  that	  he	  can	  be	  allowed	  to	  die	  alone	  on	  a	  cell	  floor….	  There’s	  no	  word	  of	  sorrow	  or	  anger	  by	  the	  authorities,	  not	  even	  a	  suggestion	  detainees	  a	  future	  won't	  suffer	  the	  same	  treatment.	  They	  just	  don't	  care.”125	  Outside	  the	  Old	  Synagogue	  where	  the	  inquest	  was	  held,	  a	  group	  of	  twenty	  people	  chanted,	  “They	  have	  killed	  Steve	  Biko.	  	  What	  have	  we	  done?	  	  Our	  sin	  is	  that	  we	  are	  black.”126	  The	  1977	  inquest	  into	  Steve	  Biko’s	  death	  left	  many	  with	  little	  hope	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  justice	  system	  of	  South	  Africa,	  forcing	  the	  public	  to	  accept	  limited	  truth	  and	  no	  justice.	  	  However,	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  apartheid	  government	  and	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Act,	  new	  hope	  was	  restored	  for	  discovering	  the	  truth	  and	  reaching	  national	  reconciliation	  under	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission,	  which	  began	  its	  public	  hearings	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	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The	  TRC	  Amnesty	  Hearings	  	  	   Twenty	  years	  later	  and	  with	  a	  new	  democratic	  government,	  between	  the	  end	  of	  1997	  and	  March	  of	  1998,	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  heard	  the	  testimonies	  of	  the	  five	  security	  police	  who	  applied	  for	  amnesty	  regarding	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko.	  	  The	  hearings,	  as	  all	  TRC	  proceedings,	  were	  public	  and	  attended	  by	  the	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  press.	  	  In	  order	  to	  successfully	  obtain	  a	  grant	  of	  amnesty	  from	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee,	  the	  officers	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  had	  acted	  illegally	  for	  a	  political	  motive,	  and	  they	  had	  to	  divulge	  the	  full	  truth	  about	  their	  crimes.	  	  The	  Biko	  family	  lawyer	  George	  Bizos	  represented	  the	  family	  again,	  opposing	  the	  officers’	  application	  for	  amnesty,	  bringing	  much	  of	  his	  expertise	  from	  assisting	  Sir	  Sydney	  Kentridge	  in	  the	  inquest	  twenty	  years	  prior.	  	  	  
Testimony	  	  	  	   Bizos’s	  two	  main	  goals	  during	  the	  hearings	  were	  to	  show	  that	  the	  officers	  were	  not	  divulging	  the	  whole	  truth	  and	  that	  they	  had	  not	  acted	  with	  a	  political	  motive	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko,	  thus	  they	  could	  not	  legally	  be	  granted	  amnesty	  as	  stipulated	  under	  the	  Act.	  	  He	  focused	  his	  cross-­‐examination	  on	  highlighting	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  inquest	  and	  the	  present	  hearing	  and	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  officers	  acted	  out	  of	  personal	  malice	  and	  ill	  will	  towards	  Biko.	  	  Thus,	  they	  were	  not	  politically	  motivated	  in	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  his	  death.	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Snyman	  Amnesty	  Hearing
127	  	   Harold	  Snyman	  was	  the	  first	  officer	  to	  take	  the	  stand,	  on	  September	  10,	  1997,	  now	  very	  old	  and	  in	  poor	  health.	  	  	  During	  cross-­‐examination	  by	  Bizos,	  he	  admitted	  to	  perjury	  during	  the	  1977	  inquest,	  asserting	  that	  he	  was	  pressured	  by	  higher-­‐ups	  in	  the	  security	  police	  to	  obscure	  and	  withhold	  details	  regarding	  Biko’s	  death.	  	  He	  recanted	  his	  previous	  statement	  at	  the	  inquest	  that	  Biko	  had	  “gone	  berserk”	  and	  thrown	  a	  chair	  at	  the	  officers,	  provoking	  a	  scuffle.	  	  He	  now	  testified	  that	  Captain	  Siebert	  had	  provoked	  Biko,	  refusing	  to	  let	  him	  sit	  down	  during	  the	  interrogation	  and	  lifting	  him	  out	  of	  his	  seat.	  	  Officer	  Beneke	  allegedly	  entered	  the	  room	  after	  hearing	  the	  commotion	  and	  “shouldered	  the	  detainee	  in	  his	  stomach.”128	  	  However,	  although	  Snyman	  now	  admitted	  there	  was	  a	  fight	  rather	  than	  a	  simple	  “scuffle,”	  he	  could	  not	  seem	  to	  recall	  who	  led	  the	  assault,	  stating,	  “…there	  were	  punches	  dealt	  out,	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  Accessed	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  Committee	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  Accessed	  March	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  2015.	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  administered	  left	  and	  right.	  	  I	  cannot	  recall	  where	  –	  who	  hit	  whom.”129	  	  Importantly,	  Snyman	  also	  admitted	  that	  Biko	  hit	  his	  head	  during	  the	  altercation;	  he	  testified,	  “…everyone	  fell	  on	  top	  of	  each	  other	  and	  in	  that	  process	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Mr.	  Biko	  bumped	  his	  head	  against	  the	  wall,”	  once	  again	  contradicting	  his	  testimony	  during	  the	  inquest.130	  	  He	  later	  stated,	  “in	  the	  process	  [of	  the	  ensuing	  struggle]	  his	  head	  knocked	  against	  the	  wall	  and	  he	  was	  temporarily	  dazed	  and	  confused.”131 	  	  	   Although	  Bizos	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Biko	  family	  counsel	  gained	  this	  important	  bit	  of	  truth,	  Snyman	  claimed	  he	  did	  not	  witness	  Biko	  hitting	  his	  head,	  but	  rather	  “heard	  the	  sound”	  of	  his	  head	  bumping	  against	  the	  wall.132	  	  Bizos	  capitalized	  on	  this	  moment	  to	  probe	  the	  witness	  further,	  asking	  how	  he	  could	  determine	  the	  sound	  of	  a	  head	  hitting	  a	  wall,	  rather	  than	  any	  other	  body	  part,	  highlighting	  a	  shortcoming	  in	  Snyman’s	  supposed	  truth-­‐telling.	  	  Snyman	  could	  not	  produce	  a	  satisfactory	  answer	  and	  attributed	  his	  lack	  of	  memory	  to	  his	  old	  age.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   After	  finally	  getting	  Snyman	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  “skirmish”	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  fight	  and	  that	  Biko	  had	  hit	  his	  head	  in	  some	  manner	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  altercation,	  Bizos	  turned	  his	  attention	  towards	  disproving	  the	  claim	  that	  Snyman	  acted	  under	  a	  political	  motive,	  instead	  attempting	  to	  show	  that	  Snyman	  and	  the	  other	  officers	  acted	  out	  of	  maleficence	  towards	  Biko.	  	  First,	  he	  cornered	  Snyman,	  arguing	  that	  if	  the	  injuries	  Biko	  sustained	  during	  the	  fight	  were	  accidental	  as	  he	  had	  claimed,	  the	  officers	  would	  have	  “done	  the	  decent	  thing”	  and	  treated	  Biko’s	  busted	  lip	  and	  other	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  Committee	  of	  the	  TRC,	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  Hearing	  Transcript:	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  Snyman."	  1997.	  Accessed	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  2015.	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  injuries.	  	  He	  went	  further,	  stating,	  “But	  because	  you	  hated	  Mr.	  Biko	  and	  what	  he	  stood	  for,	  you	  did	  nothing.”133	  	  Snyman	  shirked	  responsibility	  yet	  again,	  claiming	  that	  he	  did	  not	  hate	  Biko	  and	  that	  he	  had	  reported	  the	  incident	  to	  his	  superior	  and	  felt	  that	  that	  was	  good	  enough.	  	  	  	   Bizos	  also	  referenced	  Snyman’s	  written	  amnesty	  application,	  where	  he	  wrote	  that	  Biko	  was	  stubborn	  and	  “too	  big	  for	  his	  boots	  for	  a	  Black	  man,”	  after	  he	  demanded	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  sit	  during	  his	  interrogation.134	  	  Bizos	  pushed	  further,	  attempting	  to	  show	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  that	  the	  altercation	  was	  begun	  out	  of	  racism	  and	  contempt	  for	  Biko:	  	  	  Bizos:	  I	  see.	  So	  that	  you	  were	  offended,	  personally	  offended	  that	  you,	  a	  White	  man,	  had	  a	  pretender	  of	  political	  power	  before	  him	  and	  that	  you	  were	  not	  going	  to	  tolerate	  it	  and	  you	  told	  him	  to	  get	  up?	  Is	  that	  correct?	  Snyman:	  That	  is	  correct,	  your	  Honour.	  Bizos:	   And	   had	   it	   not	   been	   for	   your	   personal	   pride,	   combined	   with	   the	  personal	  pride	  of	  your	  fellow	  security	  policemen,	  and	  he	  was	  allowed	  to	  sit	  down,	  the	  scuffle	  or	  beating	  up	  may	  not	  have	  happened	  at	  all?	  Snyman:	   Your	   Honour,	   our	   instruction	   had	   been	   very	   clear	   from	   our	  commanding	   officer	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   we	   had	   to	   break	  down	  this	  person.135	  After	  arguing	  that	  Snyman	  and	  the	  other	  officers	  reacted	  out	  of	  hatred	  towards	  Biko	  demanding	  the	  decency	  of	  sitting	  during	  his	  interrogation,	  Bizos	  then	  further	  argued	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  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	  TRC,	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  Hearing	  Transcript:	  H	  Snyman."	  1997.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  134	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  that	  the	  officers	  acted	  under	  no	  political	  motive,	  and	  in	  fact	  the	  apartheid	  leaders	  of	  the	  time	  did	  not	  support	  the	  officers’	  actions	  against	  Biko.	  	  	  Bizos:	  I	  want	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  basic	  attempted	  justification	  on	  your	  part.	  	  That	  is	  that	   this	   was	   done	   for	   a	   political	   purpose,	   because	   of	   the	   National	   Party	  [apartheid]	   politicians’	   statements	   and	   your	   superiors…Was	   torture	  sanctioned	  to	  your	  knowledge	  by	  any	  National	  Party	  politician?	  	  Snyman:	  There	  was	  no	  pertinent	  instruction	  given	  to	  us	  in	  this	  regard.	  
… Bizos:	  So	  that	  you	  admit	  that	  you	  had	  no	  instruction	  or	  any	  encouragement	  from	  any	  politician	  to	  torture	  detainees?	  Snyman:	   Your	   Honour,	   the	   instructions	   were	   that	   when	   a	   person	   was	   in	  detention,	   these	   instructions	   were	   received	   from	   the	   commanding	   officer	  who	   gave	   directives	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   the	   interrogation	   should	   be	  managed.	  Bizos:	  We'll	  come	  to	  your	  superiors	   in	  the	  police	  force.	  Let's	   finish	  with	  the	  politicians.	  Do	  you	  admit	  that	  no	  politician,	  either	  privately	  or	  publicly	  ever	  told	  you	  that	  torturing	  detainees	  was	  to	  be	  used?	  Snyman:	   Your	   Honour,	   they	   did	   not	   state	   this	   pertinently,	   but	   from	   their	  speeches	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  they	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  us	  to	  bring	  the	  situation	  under	  control.	  Chairperson	   of	   Amnesty	   Committee:	   Are	   you	   really	   saying	   that	   what	  politicians	   said	   publicly	   for	   public	   consumption	   and	   what	   they	   allowed	   to	  happen,	  were	  two	  different	  things?	  
	  	   	   44	  	   Snyman:	  Yes,	  your	  Honour.136	  Here,	  Snyman’s	  justification	  of	  a	  political	  motive	  was	  shaky	  at	  best,	  and	  Bizos	  highlighted	  this	  shortcoming	  to	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee.	  Then,	  Patrick	  Mpshwulana,	  another	  Biko	  family	  attorney	  who	  cross-­‐examined	  Snyman	  after	  Bizos,	  prompted	  him	  further	  regarding	  his	  perjury,	  asking	  why	  he	  would	  lie	  at	  the	  inquest	  if	  he	  were	  indeed	  not	  responsible	  for	  Biko’s	  death.	  	  Snyman	  replied,	  “The	  false	  statement,	  your	  Honour,	  was	  made	  under	  the	  instructions	  of	  the	  commanding	  officer	  who	  put	  the	  words	  in	  our	  mouths,	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  speaking,	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  we	  had	  to	  say	  in	  our	  statements,”	  shirking	  responsibility	  to	  higher-­‐ups	  in	  the	  apartheid	  security	  police	  machine,	  and	  very	  importantly,	  continuing	  to	  never	  admit	  his	  own	  fault	  in	  the	  incident	  leading	  to	  Biko’s	  death.137	  	  	  The	  international	  press	  followed	  Snyman’s	  hearing	  very	  closely,	  and	  headlines	  around	  the	  world	  read,	  “Biko	  ‘too	  big	  for	  his	  boots’,”	  lauding	  George	  Bizos’s	  impeccable	  cross-­‐examination	  of	  a	  man	  who	  the	  world	  had	  already	  deemed	  a	  murderer.138	  	  The	  world	  also	  read	  about	  how	  throughout	  the	  hearing	  in	  the	  spectator	  section,	  protestors	  silently	  held	  signs	  calling	  for	  justice	  before	  reconciliation.139	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  'battering	  Ram':	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  September	  11,	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  Accessed	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  4,	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Siebert	  Amnesty	  Hearing	  	   On	  December	  8,	  1997,	  Bizos	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Biko	  family	  counsel	  continued	  their	  twofold	  strategy	  of	  disproving	  the	  officers’	  supposed	  political	  motive	  in	  killing	  Biko	  as	  well	  as	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  officers	  were	  still	  not	  divulging	  the	  whole	  truth.	  	  The	  cross-­‐examination	  of	  Daniel	  Petrus	  Siebert	  further	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  officers	  were	  not	  being	  completely	  truthful.	  	  	  	   Firstly,	  like	  Snyman,	  Siebert	  denied	  personal	  fault	  in	  Biko’s	  death.	  	  However,	  Snyman	  had	  testified	  previously	  that	  it	  was	  Siebert	  who	  had	  provoked	  the	  fight	  that	  would	  end	  up	  costing	  Biko	  his	  life.	  	  Siebert’s	  defense	  appeared	  shaky:	  Bizos:	  Mr.	  Siebert,	  did	  you	  assault	  Mr.	  Biko?	  Siebert:	  No,	  I	  did	  not.	  Bizos:	  Did	  you	  cause	  his	  death?	  Siebert:	  His	  death	  was	  caused	  by	  the	  incident	  which	  took	  place.	  Bizos:	  I	  asked	  you	  a	  simple	  question.	  Did	  you	  cause	  his	  death?	  Chairperson:	  You,	  personally?	  Siebert:	   I	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   say	   if	   it	   was	  my	   own,	   if	   I	   was	   responsible.	  There	  were	  a	  few	  of	  us	  present	  there.	  Bizos:	  Were	  you	  either	  responsible	  or	  partly	  responsible,	  which	  would	  make	  you	  responsible,	  for	  his	  death?	  Do	  you	  admit	  or	  deny	  your	  responsibility	  for	  Mr.	  Biko's	  death?	  Siebert:	  My	  participation	  in	  the	  incident,	  by	  implication,	  yes.	  Bizos:	  Now,	  you	  say	  you	  did	  not	  assault	  him.	  Please	  have	  a	  look	  at	  page	  three	  of	   your	   application.	   The	   question	   in	   9(a)(1)	   is	   clear.	   	   “What	   crime	   are	   you	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   asking	   for	   amnesty	   for?,”	   and	   your	   response	   is	   “Assault	   of	   Stephen	   Bantu	  Biko.”	  	  Is	  that	  a	  false	  statement	  in	  your	  application?	  Siebert:	  No,	   it	   is	  not.	  What	  I	  understood	  by	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  there	  was	   any	   other	   assault	   apart	   ...(end	   of	   tape	   1A)	   ...	   that	   or	   the	   fact	   that	   no	  medical	   assistance	   was	   given	   to	   him	   for	   a	   day	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   was	  chained	  to	  or	  handcuffed	  to	  the	  gate,	  that	  is	  what	  boils	  down	  to	  assault.	  Bizos:	  Not	   giving	   a	   person	   proper	  medical	   assistance	   is	   not	   an	   assault,	  Mr.	  Siebert.	  You	  are	  a	  person	  who	  has	  a	  degree,	  you	  are	  an	  intelligent	  person,	  not	  giving	  medical	  assistance	  is	  not	  an	  assault.	  Siebert:	  I	  understand	  that	  it	  could	  boil	  down	  to	  assault,	  as	  such.140	  Evidently,	  Siebert	  denied	  culpability	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko,	  even	  though	  Snyman	  had	  testified	  previously	  that	  Siebert	  helped	  provoke	  the	  fight	  that	  led	  to	  Biko’s	  brain	  injury.	  	  However,	  later	  in	  the	  hearing,	  Siebert	  admitted	  to	  punching	  Biko	  during	  that	  fight,	  which	  was	  also	  written	  into	  his	  physical	  amnesty	  application,	  highlighting	  further	  inconsistencies	  in	  his	  story.	  	   Bizos	  then	  steered	  the	  cross-­‐examination	  similarly	  as	  he	  did	  with	  Snyman	  to	  discount	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  officers	  operated	  under	  a	  political	  motive.	  	  Instead,	  he	  argued	  that	  Siebert	  acted	  under	  racism	  and	  hatred	  towards	  Biko.	  	  He	  focused	  his	  questions	  on	  the	  failed	  interrogation	  that	  led	  to	  Biko	  hitting	  his	  head,	  where	  it	  was	  agreed	  upon	  that	  the	  issue	  began	  when	  Biko	  refused	  to	  stand	  during	  his	  interrogation	  and	  instead	  took	  a	  seat.	  	  While	  Snyman	  admitted	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  Biko,	  a	  black	  man,	  defied	  an	  order	  by	  a	  white	  man	  to	  stand	  angered	  him,	  Siebert	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	  TRC,	  "Amnesty	  Hearing	  Transcript:	  Daniel	  Petrus	  Siebert."	  1997.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans%5Cpe/2biko1.htm.	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  claimed	  that	  race	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  altercation,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  rather	  an	  issue	  of	  respect	  between	  detainee	  and	  interrogator:	  Bizos:	  And	  how	  did	  you	  feel	  having	  in	  your	  absolute	  power	  a	  man	  so	  opposed	  to	  apartheid	  that	  he	  would	  actually	  claim	  the	  right	  to	  sit	  if	  he	  wanted	  to,	  even	  though	  the	  powerful	  White	  man,	  like	  yourself,	  ordered	  him	  to	  stand?	  How	  did	  you	  feel	  about	  that?	  Siebert:	  It	  was	  not	  about	  racial	  differences	  or	  colour	  of	  skin.	  As	  I	  said	  earlier,	  what	   it	   was	   about	   was	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   interrogator	   and	   the	  detainee	   and,	   obviously,	   to	   this	   day,	   the	   person	   who	   is	   doing	   the	  interrogating	  must	  be	  in	  a	  controlling	  position.	  Bizos:	   And	   I	   am	   going	   to	   put	   to	   you	   that	  Mr.	   Biko's	   death	  was	   as	   a	   direct	  result	  of	  your	  attitude	  to	  him	  as	  a	  Black	  person,	  as	  a	  person	  who	  stood	  up	  for	  his	  rights,	  that	  you,	  believing	  that	  you	  were	  a	  superior	  White	  being,	  were	  not	  prepared	  to	  respect	  him	  at	  all,	  which,	  and	  that	  you	  assaulted	  him,	  injured	  his	  head	  and	  his	  brain,	  which	  led	  to	  his	  death.	  Siebert	  :	  Mr.	  Bizos	  is	  entitled	  to	  his	  opinion	  and	  he	  is	  entitled	  to	  express	  his	  opinion,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  think	  he	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  inside	  my	  mind	  and	  to	  interpret	  what	  is	  in	  my	  head.	  So,	  I	  never	  said	  that,	  anywhere,	  that	  I,	  as	  a	  White	  person,	  was	  a	  Black	  person's	  superior	  and	  I	  would	  like	  to	  know	  where	  he	  gets	  that	  from,	  where	  I	  said	  that.	  That	  is	  a	  lie.141	  Thus,	  while	  portraying	  Snyman	  as	  a	  racist	  was	  rather	  easy,	  Siebert	  refused	  to	  admit	  any	  racial	  prejudices	  during	  the	  failed	  interrogation	  with	  Biko.	  	  However,	  Bizos	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	  TRC,	  "Amnesty	  Hearing	  Transcript:	  Daniel	  Petrus	  Siebert."	  1997.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	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  assisted	  by	  Advocate	  Potgieter	  of	  the	  Amnesty	  Commission,	  who	  was	  successful	  in	  showing	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  testimonies	  of	  the	  officers,	  when	  he	  had	  Siebert	  recount	  what	  provoked	  the	  fight	  in	  the	  interrogation	  office.	  	  Siebert	  said	  Biko	  threw	  a	  chair	  and	  swung	  at	  him;	  however,	  Snyman	  testified	  previously	  that	  they	  had	  lied	  in	  the	  1977	  inquest	  about	  Biko	  throwing	  a	  chair,	  and	  in	  fact,	  Siebert	  had	  provoked	  him	  into	  a	  fight.	  	  Instead,	  Siebert	  threw	  responsibility	  onto	  Officer	  Beneke,	  acknowledging	  that	  perhaps	  the	  fight	  would	  not	  have	  happened	  if	  Beneke	  had	  not	  intervened	  and	  knocked	  into	  Biko.142	  	  	  	   In	  the	  hearing,	  Bizos	  also	  showed	  that	  Siebert	  had	  not	  acted	  under	  the	  order	  of	  a	  superior	  in	  the	  altercation	  with	  Biko	  and	  was	  not	  operating	  under	  a	  political	  motive.	  	  Siebert	  testified	  that	  he	  was	  tasked	  with	  maintaining	  the	  apartheid	  status	  quo	  as	  a	  security	  police	  officer	  “at	  all	  costs.”143	  	  However,	  Bizos	  read	  him	  the	  Standing	  Orders	  under	  apartheid	  that	  prohibited	  the	  use	  of	  force	  against	  detainees.144	  	  Bizos	  argued	  that	  chaining	  Biko	  with	  leg	  irons	  for	  days	  at	  a	  time	  and	  keeping	  him	  naked	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  these	  Orders,	  and	  thus	  the	  officers	  were	  actually	  disobeying	  the	  apartheid	  security	  command	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  have	  been	  acting	  under	  a	  given	  order.	  	  However,	  Siebert	  countered	  that	  these	  Standing	  Orders	  were	  just	  for	  show,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  disregard	  them.	  	  	   Bizos	  then	  questioned	  Siebert	  under	  whose	  authority	  he	  acted	  in	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo;	  who	  gave	  him	  this	  command?	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	  TRC,	  "Amnesty	  Hearing	  Transcript:	  Daniel	  Petrus	  Siebert."	  1997.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  143	  Ibid.	  144	  Ibid.	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   Siebert:	  This	  was	   said	   from	  all	  political	  platforms	  at	   the	   time.	  At	   that	   stage	  the	   feeling	   was	   that	   the	   existing	   constitutional	   dispensation	   should	   be	  maintained,	   the	   State	   should	   be	   protected,	   because	   there	   was	   a	   major	  onslaught	  against	  the	  State	  and	  the	  people	  in	  the	  Black	  townships	  took	  part	  in	   this	  onslaught,	   it	   took	  place	  during	  conferences	  and	   the	   information	  was	  also	  obtained	  from	  circulars	  from	  head	  office,	  etcetera.	  Bizos:	  What	  did	  you	  understand	  by	  the	  expression	  "at	  all	  costs"?	  Siebert:	  Well,	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  Law	  and	  legislation,	  which	  was	  at	  our	  disposal.145	  However,	  Bizos	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  altercation	  in	  the	  interrogation	  office,	  Biko	  was	  beaten	  so	  badly	  and	  treated	  so	  inhumanely	  during	  the	  entirety	  of	  his	  time	  in	  custody,	  that	  it	  was	  unreasonable	  and	  frankly	  unbelievable	  that	  the	  policemen	  could	  have	  expected	  any	  useful	  information	  out	  of	  him	  that	  would	  have	  helped	  “maintain	  the	  status	  quo.”146	  	  He	  argued	  that	  they	  were	  motivated	  by	  hatred	  for	  Biko	  and	  what	  he	  represented	  and	  treated	  him	  “like	  a	  battering	  ram,”	  running	  his	  head	  into	  the	  wall	  in	  the	  interrogation	  office.147	  	  Legally,	  the	  apartheid	  government	  outlawed	  torturing	  prisoners	  and	  thus	  the	  officers	  could	  not	  claim	  their	  treatment	  of	  Biko	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  apartheid	  state;	  there	  was	  no	  justifiable	  political	  motive	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  Steve	  Biko.	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  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	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Nieuwoudt	  Amnesty	  Hearing	  	  Gideon	  Johannes	  Nieuwoudt	  not	  only	  applied	  for	  amnesty	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  Biko,	  but	  he	  also	  was	  applying	  for	  amnesty	  from	  assaulting	  Peter	  Jones,	  a	  black	  activist	  who	  was	  arrested	  with	  Biko	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Cape.	  	  Peter	  Jones	  survived,	  and	  his	  testimony	  to	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  about	  his	  abuse	  in	  police	  custody,	  similar	  to	  that	  sustained	  by	  Biko,	  showed	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  security	  police	  and	  supported	  the	  Biko	  family	  counsel’s	  claim	  that	  none	  of	  the	  officers	  acted	  under	  any	  sort	  of	  political	  motive.	  	  Nieuwoudt’s	  hearing	  was	  conducted	  separately	  from	  the	  other	  four	  officers	  applying	  for	  amnesty,	  as	  he	  was	  also	  testifying	  regarding	  Peter	  Jones.	  	  	  Nieuwoudt	  admitted	  to	  more	  than	  his	  fellow	  officers	  in	  his	  role	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  Biko,	  although	  he	  also	  continued	  to	  withhold	  information.	  	  Regarding	  the	  altercation	  in	  the	  interrogation	  office	  that	  led	  to	  Biko’s	  head	  injury,	  he	  claimed	  he	  acted	  in	  “self-­‐defense”	  against	  an	  enraged	  Biko	  but	  admitted	  that	  Biko	  hit	  his	  head	  in	  the	  ensuing	  fight.148	  	  He	  admitted	  to	  striking	  Biko	  with	  a	  house	  pipe,	  something	  that	  was	  evident	  from	  Biko’s	  autopsy	  but	  that	  none	  of	  the	  other	  officers	  had	  admitted	  to	  whatsoever.	  	  Yet,	  he	  claimed	  that	  Biko’s	  head	  injury	  was	  an	  accident	  in	  the	  altercation.	  	  Afterwards,	  Nieuwoudt	  admitted	  that	  Biko	  was	  nearly	  unconscious	  and	  that	  he	  personally	  handcuffed	  Biko	  in	  a	  “crucifix	  position	  to	  an	  iron	  grille.”149	  	  	  Importantly,	  Nieuwoudt	  testified	  that	  he	  did	  not	  know	  if	  Biko	  was	  part	  of	  a	  political	  party,	  and	  thus	  Bizos	  argued	  that	  Nieuwoudt’s	  actions	  against	  Biko	  could	  not	  have	  been	  for	  a	  political	  motive.	  	  Nieuwoudt	  testified	  that	  the	  actions	  leading	  to	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   51	  	  Biko’s	  death	  were	  “accidental”	  and	  intended	  only	  to	  constrain	  him	  in	  the	  interrogation	  room.150	  	  His	  entire	  recounting	  of	  that	  day	  did	  not	  match	  with	  the	  other	  officers	  and	  thus	  cast	  all	  of	  their	  testimonies	  further	  into	  question.	  	  	  
Marx	  Amnesty	  Hearing	  	  	   Rubin	  Marx	  testified	  that	  he	  had	  entered	  the	  interrogation	  room	  after	  hearing	  a	  commotion	  and	  fell	  with	  the	  other	  officers	  onto	  Biko	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  restrain	  him.	  	  He	  admitted	  no	  personal	  wrongdoing	  and	  in	  fact	  stated	  that	  he	  did	  not	  need	  to	  apply	  for	  amnesty	  but	  was	  encouraged	  to	  do	  so	  by	  Nieuwoudt.	  	  He	  stated	  to	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee,	  “I	  did	  not	  do	  anything.	  They	  handcuffed	  him	  and	  that	  is	  when	  I	  thought,	  let	  me	  rather	  leave.	  	  I	  did	  not	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  him	  being	  handcuffed	  to	  the	  metal	  grille	  and	  that	  was	  the	  last	  of	  it.	  	  I	  went	  to	  Colonel	  Goosen,	  I	  said	  'please	  excuse	  me'	  and	  he	  said	  to	  me	  'carry	  on	  with	  your	  normal	  duties',	  and	  that	  was	  my	  only	  involvement	  with	  the	  deceased,	  Bantu	  Biko.”151	  
Beneke	  Amnesty	  Hearing	  	  	   Jacobus	  Johannes	  Oosthuizen	  Beneke	  testified	  that	  he	  had	  heard	  that	  Biko	  had	  assaulted	  security	  police	  before,	  and	  thus	  rushed	  into	  the	  interrogation	  room	  after	  seeing	  Biko	  throw	  a	  chair	  and	  swing	  at	  Siebert.	  	  He	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  fight	  but	  supposedly	  only	  to	  protect	  Siebert,	  denying	  any	  political	  motive.	  	  Importantly,	  he	  provided	  new	  evidence	  as	  to	  how	  Biko	  sustained	  his	  head	  injury,	  as	  he	  testified,	  “After	  we	  collided	  with	  the	  wall,	  Mr.	  Biko	  fell	  forward	  and	  banged	  his	  head	  against	  the	  corner	  of	  a	  table,”	  which	  was	  information	  that	  none	  of	  the	  other	  officers	  had	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  Decision	  Number	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  1998.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/decisions/1998/981214_niewoudt.htm.	  151	  Amnesty	  Committee	  of	  the	  TRC,	  "Amnesty	  Decision	  Number	  AC/99/0020."	  1999.	  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	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  shared.152	  	  Beneke	  once	  again	  denied	  any	  wrongdoing	  and	  said	  he	  believed	  he	  did	  not	  need	  to	  apply	  for	  amnesty	  but	  was	  worried	  a	  court	  could	  find	  him	  guilty	  of	  assault.	  	  He	  also	  admitted	  to	  perjury	  at	  the	  1977	  inquest,	  allegedly	  under	  the	  orders	  of	  Colonel	  Goosen,	  who	  was	  deceased	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  amnesty	  hearing.153	  
Findings	  of	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  	  	   In	  January	  1999,	  Nieuwoudt,	  who	  had	  testified	  separately	  from	  the	  other	  four	  apartheid	  police	  applicants,	  was	  denied	  amnesty	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  Steve	  Biko.154	  	  George	  Bizos	  was	  obviously	  pleased	  at	  the	  finding	  but	  said	  this	  ruling	  was	  not	  completely	  satisfying,	  as	  it	  only	  withheld	  amnesty.	  	  However,	  he	  told	  The	  New	  York	  
Times	  that	  perhaps	  regardless	  of	  this	  outcome	  and	  the	  upcoming	  results	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  officers’	  amnesty	  hearings,	  “The	  world’s	  jury	  has	  decided.”155	  	  Just	  a	  few	  weeks	  later,	  the	  other	  four	  officers	  who	  applied	  for	  amnesty	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko	  were	  also	  denied	  amnesty.156	  	  	  	   The	  Amnesty	  Committee	  found	  that	  all	  officers	  involved	  lacked	  any	  justifiable	  political	  motive	  for	  the	  fight	  and	  subsequent	  injuries	  Biko	  suffered	  in	  interrogation	  room	  619.	  	  The	  only	  objective	  the	  officers	  had	  was	  to	  restrain	  Biko	  after	  a	  supposed	  violent	  outbreak	  against	  Officer	  Siebert.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  this	  incident	  furthered	  the	  officers’	  greater	  goal	  of	  criminally	  prosecuting	  Biko	  for	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activities	  was	  found	  to	  be	  untrue	  by	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee,	  and	  instead	  they	  attributed	  the	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  Committee	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  the	  TRC,	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  Accessed	  March	  15,	  2015.	  153	  Ibid.	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  Suzanne	  Daley,	  "Officer	  Is	  Denied	  Amnesty	  In	  the	  Killing	  of	  Steve	  Biko."	  The	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  York	  Times,	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  Ibid.	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  scuffle	  and	  indeed	  their	  greater	  search	  for	  evidence	  to	  “normal	  police	  duties”	  that	  were	  “not	  political	  in	  nature.”157	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  Committee	  also	  found	  that	  the	  officers	  did	  not	  admit	  personal	  wrongdoing	  in	  Biko’s	  death;	  instead,	  they	  either	  claimed	  they	  had	  acted	  legally	  in	  self-­‐defense	  or	  that	  they	  were	  simply	  trying	  to	  restrain	  Biko.158	  	  	  	   Finally,	  the	  Committee	  found	  that	  the	  officers	  did	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  truth,	  as	  highlighted	  through	  Bizos’s	  cross-­‐examinations.	  	  They	  write	  in	  their	  decision,	  	  “It	  appears	  more	  probable	  that	  Biko	  was	  attacked	  after	  Applicants	  did	  not	  take	  kindly	  to	  his	  arrogant,	  recalcitrant	  and	  non	  co-­‐operative	  attitude	  particularly	  exemplified	  by	  his	  occupying	  a	  chair	  without	  their	  permission	  to	  do	  so.	  	  This	  attack	  appears	  to	  be	  actuated	  by	  ill-­‐will	  or	  spite	  towards	  Biko.	  This	  view	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  cruel	  and	  inhumane	  manner	  in	  which	  Biko	  was	  treated	  after	  he	  sustained	  the	  fatal	  injury,	  in	  particular	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  he	  was	  shackled	  to	  the	  metal	  grille	  and	  his	  transportation	  to	  Pretoria.”	  Thus,	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  found	  that	  the	  applicants	  had	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  for	  amnesty	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  Act,	  and	  thus	  they	  were	  denied	  amnesty.	  	  Harold	  Snyman	  died	  before	  hearing	  the	  decision	  on	  his	  amnesty	  application.159	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  Accessed	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  "Biko	  Case	  Cops	  Might	  Face	  Murder	  Charges."	  The	  Gazette,	  February	  18,	  1999.	  
	  	   	   54	  	  
Results	  of	  TRC	  Process	  	  	  	   In	  all,	  the	  TRC	  received	  the	  testimony	  of	  21,000	  victims	  of	  apartheid,	  with	  2,000	  people	  presenting	  their	  stories	  at	  public	  hearings.160	  	  The	  Amnesty	  Committee	  received	  7,112	  amnesty	  applications	  and	  granted	  849	  amnesties.161	  	  In	  its	  final	  report	  presented	  to	  President	  Nelson	  Mandela	  in	  October	  1998,	  the	  17-­‐member	  TRC	  provided	  a	  summary	  of	  their	  activities	  and	  also	  provided	  recommendations	  for	  next	  steps	  in	  South	  Africa.162	  	  They	  called	  for	  reparations	  to	  all	  victims	  totaling	  $3,500	  each	  year	  for	  six	  years,	  prosecution	  in	  cases	  where	  amnesty	  was	  denied,	  archiving	  of	  all	  TRC	  documents,	  and	  a	  reform	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  society	  and	  political	  system	  to	  include	  nearly	  all	  institutions	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  process.163	  	  	   However,	  the	  TRC’s	  final	  report	  was	  almost	  not	  released,	  as	  both	  the	  ANC	  and	  former	  President	  F.W.	  de	  Klerk	  launched	  legal	  proceedings	  to	  prevent	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  report	  to	  President	  Mandela.164	  	  De	  Klerk’s	  legal	  proceeding	  was	  successful	  in	  that	  he	  got	  a	  small	  section	  of	  the	  final	  report	  removed	  that	  implicated	  him	  in	  human	  rights	  abuses.165	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  ANC’s	  legal	  proceeding,	  claiming	  that	  the	  TRC	  failed	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  party’s	  objections	  surrounding	  the	  commission’s	  findings	  on	  the	  ANC’s	  own	  human	  rights	  abuses	  while	  fighting	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  apartheid,	  was	  denied.166	  	  Deputy	  President	  Thabo	  Mbeki,	  serving	  as	  president	  of	  the	  ANC,	  announced	  to	  the	  press	  that	  the	  ANC	  had	  “serious	  reservations”	  about	  the	  report	  and	  continued	  to	  fight	  its	  release	  until	  October	  1998.167	  	  	  	   President	  Mandela	  commended	  the	  TRC	  on	  its	  final	  report	  and	  publicly	  apologized	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state	  to	  all	  victims	  of	  apartheid.168	  	  In	  2006	  the	  government	  created	  a	  body	  to	  implement	  the	  TRC’s	  final	  recommendations,	  and	  it	  focused	  primarily	  on	  exhumations	  of	  bodies	  and	  reparations.169	  Then,	  there	  was	  a	  resistance	  to	  post-­‐TRC	  prosecution	  by	  many	  in	  the	  government	  that	  led	  to	  a	  2005	  prosecution	  policy	  that	  allowed	  the	  National	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  to	  refuse	  to	  prosecute.170	  	  Although	  a	  Pretoria	  High	  Court	  later	  found	  this	  policy	  unconstitutional,	  it	  showed	  a	  governmental	  resistance	  to	  pursuing	  tricky	  prosecutions	  where	  much	  evidence	  was	  either	  destroyed	  or	  nonexistent.	  	  In	  2007,	  President	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  created	  a	  special	  pardons	  program	  for	  apartheid	  criminals,	  which	  was	  continued	  by	  Presidents	  Mothlanthe	  and	  Zuma,	  although	  many	  civil	  society	  organizations	  fought	  against	  this	  program,	  as	  they	  felt	  it	  diminished	  the	  TRC	  and	  went	  against	  the	  Act’s	  original	  provisions.171	  	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  turning	  tide,	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  country’s	  top	  leadership,	  towards	  forgetting	  apartheid	  and	  moving	  on	  without	  prosecutions	  or	  investigations.	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No	  Prosecution	  of	  Biko’s	  Murderers	  	  	   Following	  the	  denial	  of	  amnesty	  to	  all	  five	  applicants	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko,	  the	  officers	  were	  therefore	  open	  to	  prosecution	  by	  the	  Justice	  Ministry	  for	  their	  crimes.	  	  The	  initial	  idea	  in	  1999	  was	  to	  prosecute	  the	  officers	  for	  murder,	  as	  the	  statute	  of	  limitations	  for	  any	  count	  less	  than	  murder	  had	  expired	  under	  South	  African	  criminal	  law.172	  	  However,	  in	  2003	  the	  Justice	  Ministry	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  not	  seek	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  the	  five	  officers,	  as	  there	  was	  insufficient	  evidence	  to	  support	  a	  murder	  charge,	  especially	  as	  there	  were	  no	  eyewitnesses	  to	  the	  event.173	  	  Additionally,	  the	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  men	  during	  their	  amnesty	  hearings	  would	  likely	  not	  be	  admissible	  in	  court.174	  	  Thus,	  in	  actuality,	  there	  were	  no	  real	  legal	  consequences	  for	  the	  five	  officers	  involved	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko.	  	   Although	  the	  majority	  of	  applicants	  to	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  were	  denied	  amnesty,	  only	  three	  prosecutions	  were	  initiated	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  TRC,	  and	  only	  one	  person	  was	  convicted.175	  	  There	  was	  typically	  a	  lack	  of	  evidence	  and	  often	  too	  much	  time	  had	  passed	  to	  open	  a	  case.176	  	  Thus,	  the	  Biko	  case	  was	  not	  an	  exception	  by	  any	  means	  but	  was	  rather	  the	  norm.	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ANALYSIS	  Following	  an	  undeniably	  emotional	  and	  tense	  transition	  to	  democracy,	  what	  exactly	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  AZAPO	  case	  and	  the	  TRC	  in	  general	  on	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa?	  	  	  
AZAPO	  	  	   Undeniably,	  the	  AZAPO	  case	  had	  enduring	  political	  impact	  on	  the	  new	  democratic	  nation	  of	  South	  Africa.	  	  Two	  main	  issues	  surrounded	  the	  reaction	  to	  the	  AZAPO	  court	  case:	  first,	  was	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  an	  act	  of	  political	  expediency	  or	  was	  it	  rather	  a	  well-­‐reasoned	  and	  legal	  court	  decision?	  	  Second,	  did	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  to	  uphold	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act	  mark	  a	  violation	  of	  international	  law,	  allowing	  indemnity	  for	  human	  rights	  violators?	  
Political	  Expediency	  Debate	  	  	   	  First	  of	  all,	  amnesty	  was	  a	  central	  tenet	  of	  the	  negotiated	  settlement	  between	  the	  apartheid	  government	  and	  the	  ANC	  (representing	  the	  black	  majority	  population	  of	  the	  country).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Africa,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  clear	  victor	  or	  loser;	  there	  were	  bitter	  and	  seemingly	  insurmountable	  debates	  between	  the	  two	  sides	  regarding	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy,	  with	  the	  apartheid	  government	  pushing	  for	  amnesty	  for	  its	  members.	  	  The	  agreement	  to	  create	  the	  Act	  was	  on	  shaky	  ground	  to	  begin	  with,	  due	  to	  its	  very	  nature	  as	  a	  political	  compromise.	  	  Thus	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case,	  the	  new	  Constitutional	  Court	  faced	  strong	  pressure	  to	  reach	  an	  equitable	  decision.	  	  Most	  challengingly,	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  ascertain	  the	  relative	  validity	  of	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  in	  order	  to	  make	  its	  decision,	  which	  is	  described	  by	  one	  scholar	  as,	  “the	  product	  of	  political	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  wheeling	  and	  dealing	  appended	  to	  a	  transitional	  constitution	  in	  a	  last	  minute	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  a	  relatively	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  a	  new	  dispensation.”177	  	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  to	  uphold	  the	  Act’s	  amnesty	  provision	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case	  was	  an	  act	  of	  jurisprudence	  or	  rather	  an	  act	  of	  political	  expediency	  to	  further	  a	  political	  goal	  of	  reconciliation.178	  	  The	  Court’s	  decision	  hinged	  upon	  determining	  whether	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  (which	  called	  for	  an	  act	  of	  parliament	  to	  promote	  reconciliation	  and	  was	  inherently	  a	  political	  compromise)	  was	  on	  equal	  legal	  footing	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  constitution.	  	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  Court	  knew	  the	  political	  risk	  of	  revoking	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act,	  and	  potentially	  casting	  South	  Africa	  into	  racial	  violence,	  which	  colored	  their	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  even	  before	  the	  AZAPO	  counsel	  presented	  its	  arguments,	  the	  Court	  knew	  it	  had	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  legally	  uphold	  reconciliation	  and	  amnesty	  because	  of	  political	  pressure.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  deemed	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  to	  be	  on	  equal	  footing	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  it	  refused	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  international	  law	  provisions	  that	  the	  AZAPO	  legal	  team	  had	  brought	  up.	  	  	  Professor	  Lourens	  de	  Plessis	  argues,	  “Had	  the	  Court	  in	  AZAPO	  struck	  down	  the	  impugned	  section	  20(7)	  of	  the	  Promotion	  of	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act,	  the	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  process	  would	  have	  certainly	  ground	  to	  a	  halt	  –	  with	  (potentially)	  ghastly	  consequences.”179	  While	  he	  concedes	  that	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case	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   59	  	  was	  “messy,”	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  future	  would	  have	  been	  “messier”	  without	  the	  “admittedly	  imperfect	  and	  legally	  problematic	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  process,”	  which	  the	  AZAPO	  decision	  upheld.180	  	  He	  further	  argues	  that	  the	  Court	  itself	  was	  “charged	  with	  the	  responsibility	  to	  pronounce	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  ‘truth	  and	  reconciliation	  legislation,’”	  insinuating	  that	  the	  Court	  knew	  the	  decision	  it	  had	  to	  make	  even	  before	  hearing	  the	  AZAPO	  legal	  team’s	  arguments.181	  Instead	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  AZAPO	  decision	  as	  a	  “messy”	  but	  overall	  positive	  and	  indispensable	  act	  in	  South	  African	  history,	  scholar	  Nthabiseng	  Mogale	  offers	  a	  more	  critical	  response	  to	  the	  AZAPO	  decision,	  writing,	  “In	  AZAPO,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  law	  became	  instruments	  that	  were	  mobilised	  and	  manipulated	  by	  the	  state	  to	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  victims	  of	  apartheid	  to	  secure	  the	  enforcement	  of	  their	  rights	  and	  freedoms.”182	  	  Mogale	  argues	  that	  the	  Court	  made	  a	  decision	  based	  on	  political	  expediency	  and	  that	  “the	  essential	  precondition	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  law	  is	  that	  it	  shall	  display	  an	  independence	  from	  gross	  manipulation	  and	  shall	  seem	  to	  be	  just…it	  cannot	  seem	  to	  be	  so	  without	  upholding	  its	  own	  criteria	  of	  equity,	  rather	  than	  the	  criteria	  that	  fit	  in	  with	  a	  political	  agenda,”	  in	  this	  case,	  furthering	  the	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  process,	  which	  depended	  on	  an	  amnesty	  provision.183	  	  Mogale	  further	  attacks	  the	  Court’s	  decision,	  claiming	  that	  the	  Court	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   60	  	  presented	  amnesty	  as	  a	  right,	  instead	  of	  as	  what	  it	  truly	  was	  –	  a	  “negotiated	  political	  privilege”	  between	  the	  ANC	  and	  the	  apartheid	  government.184	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Patrick	  Lenta	  provides	  a	  middle	  ground	  between	  du	  Plessis	  and	  Mogale,	  arguing	  that	  while	  indeed	  the	  AZAPO	  court	  case	  was	  imperfect,	  there	  is	  no	  solution	  to	  every	  moral	  question	  in	  the	  world.	  	  He	  presents	  an	  argument	  from	  many	  scholars	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  transition,	  that	  “in	  upholding	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  amnesty	  provision,	  the	  Court	  licensed	  the	  sacrifice	  of	  justice,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  prosecution	  of	  perpetrators,	  for	  truth,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  full	  confessions	  by	  perpetrators	  motivated	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  amnesty.”185	  	  Thus,	  here,	  these	  scholars	  see	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act	  as	  a	  false	  way	  of	  motivating	  human	  rights	  violators	  to	  tell	  the	  “truth,”	  whatever	  that	  may	  be,	  solely	  for	  the	  hope	  of	  amnesty.	  	  In	  the	  AZAPO	  case,	  the	  Court	  “licensed”	  this	  tradeoff	  of	  justice	  for	  truth,	  thus	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  court	  was	  working	  under	  political	  expediency.	  Lenta	  also	  presents	  another,	  new	  argument	  from	  other	  scholars,	  that	  amnesty	  for	  civil	  liability	  is	  not	  explicitly	  written	  into	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  and	  thus	  the	  Court’s	  defense	  of	  amnesty	  for	  civil	  liability	  was	  not	  legally	  justifiable,	  and	  thus	  was	  another	  clear	  example	  of	  political	  expediency.186	  	  	  Thus,	  while	  there	  are	  many	  debates	  within	  scholarly	  circles	  about	  the	  AZAPO	  decision,	  most	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  future	  of	  South	  Africa	  would	  have	  been	  markedly	  different,	  and	  probably	  more	  violent,	  if	  the	  Court	  had	  struck	  down	  the	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  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  Perhaps	  integral	  to	  the	  potential	  denial	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  amnesty	  was	  international	  law,	  which	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  comment	  on	  as	  they	  deemed	  it	  had	  no	  direct	  bearing	  on	  a	  domestic	  law	  case,	  which	  presents	  the	  next	  major	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  AZAPO	  decision.	  	  
Issues	  with	  International	  Law	  	  	   Many	  scholars	  agree	  that	  the	  Court	  failed	  to	  answer	  valid	  questions	  about	  the	  Act	  and	  international	  law,	  which	  perhaps	  would	  have	  led	  to	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  amnesty	  provision.	  	  According	  to	  Mogale,	  the	  Court	  “failed	  to	  consider	  the	  sources	  of	  international	  law	  on	  the	  right	  of	  a	  victim	  both	  to	  have	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  a	  war	  crime	  or	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  punished	  by	  a	  competent	  tribunal	  and	  to	  seek	  civil	  redress	  from	  the	  perpetrator.”187	  	  However,	  while	  the	  Court	  was	  upholding	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  epilogue	  of	  the	  Interim	  Constitution,	  it	  was	  ignoring	  the	  Interim	  Constitution’s	  high	  regard	  for	  international	  law.188	  	  	  A	  larger	  and	  more	  comprehensive	  argument	  is	  that	  international	  law	  forbids	  amnesty	  and	  thus	  the	  Court	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  international	  law	  by	  upholding	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act.189	  	  Noted	  international	  law	  professor	  Diane	  Orentlicher,	  as	  quoted	  by	  Braude	  and	  Spitz,	  writes	  that	  while	  an	  amnesty	  law	  may	  indeed	  be	  legal	  domestically,	  the	  amnesty	  law	  can	  still	  violate	  a	  state’s	  international	  obligations	  under	  international	  human	  rights	  law.190	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   62	  	   However,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  the	  AZAPO	  legal	  team’s	  stance	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  international	  law	  was	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  case,	  which	  primarily	  centered	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  Yet,	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  here	  the	  Court	  perhaps	  betrayed	  its	  hope	  for	  political	  expediency,	  as	  undeniably	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  recognized	  the	  authority	  of	  international	  law,	  and	  international	  law	  was	  the	  arguably	  the	  only	  way	  to	  discredit	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  in	  the	  greater	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  process.	  	  	  	  	  A	  London-­‐based	  newspaper,	  The	  Independent,	  reported	  on	  the	  AZAPO	  decision	  and	  quoted	  Biko’s	  widow	  as	  being	  “very	  frustrated”	  with	  the	  Court’s	  decision.191	  	  The	  families	  and	  their	  legal	  counsel	  claimed	  that	  “the	  state	  was	  ignoring	  its	  obligation	  under	  international	  law	  to	  ‘criminalise,	  prosecute	  and	  punish	  war	  crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity,’”	  which	  thus	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  if	  the	  South	  African	  government	  was	  rejecting	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  apartheid	  merited	  the	  label	  of	  “crime	  against	  humanity”	  (much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  many	  victims’	  families).192	  
Public	  Perceptions	  of	  Amnesty	  	   Similarly	  to	  the	  heated	  scholarly	  debate,	  the	  people	  of	  South	  Africa	  were	  divided	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  amnesty.	  	  According	  to	  surveys	  conducted	  by	  various	  research	  firms	  in	  South	  Africa,	  48%	  of	  South	  Africans	  agreed	  in	  the	  1990s	  that,	  “amnesty	  may	  be	  granted	  if	  people	  come	  forward	  and	  confess	  their	  crimes,”	  while	  50%	  of	  South	  Africans	  believed	  that	  people	  who	  did	  not	  apply	  for	  amnesty	  should	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  be	  prosecuted.193	  	  Interestingly,	  according	  to	  a	  1996	  survey	  conducted	  by	  Market	  Research	  Africa,	  African	  respondents	  were	  more	  in	  favor	  of	  amnesty	  than	  any	  other	  ethnic	  group	  in	  South	  Africa.194	  	  Additionally,	  more	  than	  two	  in	  three	  respondents	  believed	  that	  families	  of	  victims	  should	  have	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  bring	  civil	  claims	  (suing	  for	  damages)	  against	  human	  rights	  violators,	  thus	  demonstrating	  a	  strong	  dislike	  of	  civil	  amnesty	  that	  the	  AZAPO	  decision	  upheld.195	  
TRC	  	   From	  the	  beginning,	  the	  TRC	  was	  contentious	  and	  perhaps	  even	  increased	  racial	  tensions	  between	  black	  and	  white	  South	  Africans.	  	  All	  17	  commissioners	  chosen	  for	  the	  TRC	  were	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activists,	  which	  worried	  many	  apartheid	  leaders	  about	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  process.196	  	  There	  were	  two	  Afrikaner	  commissioners,	  four	  English,	  two	  Indians,	  two	  Coloured,	  and	  seven	  Africans,	  with	  nine	  men	  and	  eight	  women.197	  	  Outside	  of	  the	  commission,	  in	  the	  Orange	  Free	  State,	  Afrikaners	  refused	  to	  serve	  black	  South	  Africans	  in	  restaurants	  during	  the	  entire	  TRC	  process.198	  	  Many	  black	  South	  Africans	  became	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  TRC	  process	  as	  some	  human	  rights	  violators	  walked	  away	  unscathed,	  with	  amnesty.	  	  And	  politically,	  while	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  TRC	  received	  widespread	  support	  from	  most	  political	  parties,	  including	  the	  apartheid	  architect	  National	  Party,	  the	  Afrikaner	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  (New	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  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  275.	  197	  Ibid,	  275.	  198	  Ibid,	  277.	  
	  	   	   64	  	  nationalist	  Freedom	  Front	  party	  voted	  against	  the	  Act	  establishing	  the	  TRC.199	  	  The	  Zulu	  nationalist	  Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party	  abstained	  from	  the	  vote	  but	  later	  condemned	  the	  TRC	  as	  a	  nothing	  but	  a	  political	  “tool”	  of	  the	  ANC	  and	  the	  United	  Democratic	  Front	  party.200	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  South	  African	  TRC	  has	  been	  largely	  respected	  for	  its	  unique	  approach	  to	  transitional	  justice,	  how	  was	  the	  TRC	  perceived	  by	  the	  people	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  process?	  	  Did	  it	  promote	  racial	  harmony	  and	  reconciliation,	  as	  originally	  hoped	  for?	  
Domestic	  Reactions	  to	  the	  TRC	  	  	   Various	  research	  firms	  conducted	  public	  opinion	  surveys	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  the	  TRC	  process	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  Interestingly	  yet	  unsurprisingly,	  many	  perceptions	  of	  the	  TRC	  process	  differed	  along	  racial	  lines.	  	  In	  a	  survey	  conducted	  by	  Research	  Surveys	  in	  1998,	  56%	  of	  African	  respondents	  believed	  that	  the	  TRC	  “contributed	  to	  peace	  and	  reconciliation,”	  while	  54%	  of	  white	  respondents	  held	  the	  opposite	  belief	  that	  the	  TRC	  “failed	  to	  promote	  reconciliation.”201	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  clear,	  the	  most	  probable	  explanation	  for	  this	  racial	  difference	  may	  have	  been	  that	  black	  South	  Africans	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  ANC	  and	  thus	  were	  prone	  to	  support	  ANC-­‐backed	  initiatives,	  such	  as	  the	  TRC.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  due	  in	  some	  part	  to	  many	  black	  South	  African’s	  belief	  in	  ubuntu,	  meaning	  that	  all	  of	  our	  humanities	  are	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   65	  	  linked	  together,	  and	  thus	  any	  attempts	  at	  healing	  a	  society	  should	  be	  supported,	  as	  everyone	  would	  benefit.	  	   A	  continuous	  survey	  combining	  data	  from	  several	  research	  firms	  tracked	  public	  perceptions	  of	  white	  and	  black	  South	  Africans	  regarding	  whether	  the	  TRC	  would	  be	  fair	  and	  then	  after	  it	  began,	  if	  it	  was	  fair	  to	  all	  sides	  involved.202	  	  In	  the	  chart	  of	  results	  below,	  the	  researchers	  found	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  African	  respondents	  believed	  the	  TRC	  was	  fair	  while	  consistently	  a	  minority	  of	  white	  respondents	  found	  the	  same	  to	  be	  true.	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  both	  ethnic	  groups’	  endorsement	  of	  the	  TRC	  dropped	  several	  percentage	  points	  after	  the	  TRC	  commenced.	  	  	  
203	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  (Important	  to	  note	  for	  this	  thesis,	  these	  perceptions	  do	  not	  include	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  TRC	  after	  the	  landmark	  amnesty	  hearings	  for	  Biko’s	  murderers	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  Thus,	  although	  these	  data	  cannot	  demonstrate	  any	  specific	  impact	  of	  the	  Biko	  case	  on	  public	  attitudes,	  they	  offer	  insight	  into	  racial	  differences	  in	  attitudes	  as	  well	  as	  trends	  over	  time).	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  a	  separate	  study	  from	  the	  HSRC	  in	  1998,	  respondents	  were	  asked,	  “Do	  you	  think	  the	  TRC	  has	  been	  a	  good	  or	  bad	  thing	  for	  the	  country?”204	  	  The	  results	  are	  summarized	  below:	  	  	  
205	  While	  a	  majority	  of	  respondents	  found	  the	  TRC	  to	  be	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  South	  Africa,	  African	  respondents	  held	  the	  most	  positive	  views	  of	  the	  process,	  while	  a	  majority	  of	  white	  South	  Africans	  believed	  the	  TRC	  was	  a	  “very	  bad	  thing”	  for	  the	  country.	  	  Thus,	  can	  the	  TRC	  be	  deemed	  effective	  in	  its	  goals	  of	  reconciliation,	  if	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  entire	  process	  are	  so	  skewed	  along	  racial	  lines?	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   67	  	  	   In	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  two	  professors	  from	  St.	  Cloud	  State	  University	  who	  surveyed	  158	  participants	  at	  a	  South	  African	  university	  who	  identified	  as	  either	  English	  South	  African	  (white),	  Afrikaner	  (white),	  or	  Xhosa	  (black),	  they	  found	  that	  none	  of	  the	  three	  ethnic	  groups	  found	  the	  TRC	  to	  be	  highly	  successful,	  although	  the	  Xhosa	  held	  a	  slightly	  more	  favorable	  view	  of	  the	  process	  than	  the	  white	  South	  African	  groups.206	  	  The	  three	  ethnic	  groups	  also	  found	  the	  TRC	  to	  be	  less	  successful	  at	  bringing	  about	  reconciliation	  than	  finding	  the	  truth.207	  	  Qualitative	  comments	  from	  all	  of	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  believed	  that	  the	  TRC	  “opened	  old	  wounds	  without	  proper	  support	  for	  healing	  and	  with	  a	  high	  potential	  for	  generating	  anger	  and	  revenge”	  as	  victims	  had	  to	  relive	  their	  traumas.208	  	  This	  prevailing	  belief	  calls	  into	  question	  whether	  the	  TRC	  promoted	  the	  goal	  of	  reconciliation	  as	  much	  as	  originally	  intended.	  	  	  	   Only	  the	  Xhosa	  participants	  found	  that	  the	  TRC	  gave	  South	  Africa	  a	  positive	  image	  in	  the	  world,	  whereas	  no	  Afrikaner	  participant	  believed	  this	  to	  be	  true.209	  	  Also,	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  Xhosa	  participants	  believed	  that	  the	  TRC	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  South	  African	  society	  and	  that	  society	  was	  better	  off	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  TRC,	  both	  the	  English	  and	  Afrikaner	  participants	  were	  concerned	  that	  the	  TRC	  was	  a	  “waste	  of	  money”	  with	  little	  long-­‐term	  success	  for	  the	  country,	  as	  it	  continuously	  reopened	  old	  wounds.210	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Political	  Cartoons	  	  	   Important	  for	  assessing	  public	  perceptions	  of	  the	  TRC,	  political	  cartoons,	  the	  most	  notable	  ones	  coming	  from	  South	  African	  cartoonist	  Zapiro,	  showed	  how	  some	  people	  perceived	  the	  TRC.	  	  In	  this	  famous	  cartoon,	  Zapiro	  shows	  the	  TRC	  commissioners	  being	  led	  by	  TRC	  Commissioner	  Desmond	  Tutu	  on	  a	  hike	  up	  a	  hill	  made	  of	  skulls	  of	  victims	  of	  apartheid,	  with	  a	  woman	  representing	  retributive	  justice	  being	  left	  out	  of	  the	  journey,	  demonstrating	  Zapiro’s	  frustration	  with	  the	  commission’s	  lack	  of	  prosecutions	  and	  criminal	  justice	  for	  human	  rights	  violators	  under	  apartheid.211	  	  	  	  
212 Zapiro	  also	  drew	  a	  cartoon	  that	  perhaps	  encapsulated	  many	  people’s	  perception	  of	  the	  difficult	  goals	  of	  both	  full	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  result	  of	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  May	  1,	  1996.	  Accessed	  March	  13,	  2015.	  http://www.zapiro.com/cartoon/124602-­‐960501so#.VQNChxAbCH4.	  212	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   69	  	  the	  commission,	  showing	  TRC	  Commissioner	  Desmond	  Tutu	  failing	  to	  reach	  reconciliation	  from	  truth.213	  	  
214	  These	  political	  cartoons,	  among	  many	  others,	  were	  seen	  around	  the	  world	  and	  showed	  a	  general	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  TRC	  proceedings,	  with	  critiques	  of	  the	  truth	  versus	  justice	  tradeoff	  as	  well	  as	  the	  question	  of	  amnesty	  versus	  retributive	  justice.	  
Scholarly	  Response	  	  
	   There	  are	  countless	  scholarly	  articles	  written	  surrounding	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  TRC	  in	  promoting	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa,	  with	  almost	  every	  possible	  viewpoint	  represented.	  	  Professors	  Vora	  and	  Vora	  remarked	  that	  perhaps	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Jonathan	  Shapiro,	  "Criticisms	  of	  the	  Truth	  &	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  of	  South	  Africa."	  The	  Truth	  &	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  of	  South	  Africa.	  Accessed	  March	  13,	  2015.	  https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~finde20b/classweb/Templates/criticisms.html.	  214	  Ibid.	  
	  	   	   70	  	  reconciliation	  may	  have	  been	  “too	  much	  to	  ask”	  in	  post-­‐apartheid	  South	  Africa.215	  	  Professor	  Thomas	  Nagel	  of	  New	  York	  University	  writes	  that	  “it	  is	  naïve	  to	  suppose	  that	  there	  is	  a	  solution	  to	  every	  moral	  problem	  with	  which	  the	  world	  can	  face	  us,”	  which	  Patrick	  Lenta	  interprets	  as	  supporting	  his	  claim	  that	  South	  Africa	  did	  the	  best	  it	  could	  with	  the	  Act	  and	  the	  subsequent	  TRC.216	  	  Elizabeth	  Stanley	  writes	  that	  the	  TRC	  only	  symbolically	  promoted	  reconciliation,	  as	  it	  did	  not	  deal	  with	  “the	  central	  issues	  of	  social	  and	  criminal	  justice”	  and	  lacked	  “a	  thorough	  attempt	  to	  tackle	  the	  fall-­‐out	  from	  apartheid.”217	  	  Alex	  Boraine	  defends	  the	  TRC	  and	  asserts	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  and	  beneficial	  for	  South	  Africa,	  writing,	  “…There	  is	  a	  determination	  that	  what	  was	  experienced	  in	  the	  past	  must	  never	  happen	  again.	  	  It	  is	  this	  new	  spirit,	  this	  commitment,	  that	  was	  primarily	  the	  TRC’s	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  a	  country	  emerging	  from	  a	  very	  dark	  night	  of	  the	  soul	  into	  a	  new	  day.”218	  	  	  	   Clearly,	  there	  is	  no	  scholarly	  consensus	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  South	  African	  TRC,	  with	  compelling	  arguments	  on	  multiple	  fronts.	  
Biko	  Family	  Reaction	  to	  TRC	  	  	   After	  failing	  to	  get	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act	  stricken	  down,	  the	  Biko	  family	  was	  understandably	  dismayed	  to	  see	  five	  apartheid	  police	  apply	  for	  amnesty	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko.	  	  Biko’s	  widow,	  Ntsiki	  Biko	  told	  The	  Independent	  in	  1997	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  Erika	  Vora	  and	  Jay	  Vora,	  "The	  Effectiveness	  of	  South	  Africa's	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission:	  Perceptions	  of	  Xhosa,	  Afrikaner,	  and	  English	  South	  Africans,"	  317.	  216	  Patrick	  Lenta,	  “In	  defence	  of	  AZAPO	  and	  restorative	  justice,”	  182.	  217Elizabeth	  Stanley,	  "Evaluating	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission."	  In	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  
African	  Studies,	  525-­‐546.	  3rd	  ed.	  Vol.	  39.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  527.	  218	  Alex	  Boraine,	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  The	  Third	  Way”	  in	  Robert	  Rotberg	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson,	  Truth	  v.	  Justice:	  The	  Morality	  of	  Truth	  Commissions	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  157.	  
	  	   	   71	  	  that	  the	  TRC	  would	  “rob”	  her	  of	  justice.219	  	  She	  also	  commented	  in	  1996	  that	  Biko’s	  grave	  was	  “unattended	  and	  overgrown”	  and	  that	  the	  ANC	  did	  not	  commemorate	  his	  death.220	  	  She	  told	  the	  press,	  “Many	  politicians	  in	  high	  places	  seem	  to	  have	  forgotten	  what	  they	  owe	  Steve.”221	  	  	  
President	  Nelson	  Mandela	  on	  the	  TRC	  	  	   At	  a	  speech	  in	  1997	  on	  the	  twentieth	  anniversary	  of	  Steve	  Biko’s	  death,	  President	  Mandela	  commented	  on	  the	  truth	  versus	  justice	  tradeoff	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  TRC.	  	  He	  stated,	  “As	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  inches	  its	  way	  towards	  truth,	  we	  are	  all	  bound	  to	  agonise	  over	  the	  price	  in	  terms	  of	  justice	  that	  the	  victims	  had	  to	  pay.	  	  But	  we	  can	  draw	  solace	  from	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  half-­‐truths	  of	  a	  lowly	  interrogator	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  hide	  the	  culpability	  of	  the	  commanders	  and	  the	  political	  leaders	  who	  gave	  the	  orders.	  	  For	  we	  do	  know,	  that	  what	  they	  desperately	  sought	  to	  get	  from	  him	  was	  his	  contact	  with	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  liberation	  movement.	  	  In	  time,	  the	  truth	  will	  come	  out!”222	  	  Here,	  although	  Mandela	  recognizes	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  for	  the	  TRC	  to	  uncover	  the	  whole	  truth,	  he	  supports	  the	  TRC	  as	  a	  process	  that	  “inches”	  towards	  the	  truth,	  even	  though	  victims	  have	  to	  sacrifice	  a	  bit	  of	  justice	  to	  hopefully	  get	  there.	  
Moving	  Forward	  	   Above	  all,	  there	  is	  a	  pervasive	  critique	  in	  both	  scholarly	  circles	  and	  the	  general	  populace	  that	  the	  South	  African	  government	  did	  not	  follow	  through	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  Mary	  Braid,	  "An	  Enduring	  Influence,	  but	  Nation	  Divides	  over	  Legacy	  of	  Steve	  Biko."	  The	  Independent.	  January	  28,	  1997.	  Accessed	  March	  13,	  2015.	  	  220	  Ibid.	  221	  Ibid.	  	  222	  President	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  Address	  at	  the	  Commemoration	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Anniversary	  of	  Steve	  
Biko’s	  Death,	  September	  12,	  1997.	  
	  	   	   72	  	  TRC’s	  recommendation	  for	  widespread	  and	  generous	  reparations	  to	  apartheid	  victims.	  	  The	  1998	  TRC	  final	  report	  included	  survey	  data	  on	  survivors’	  expectations	  from	  the	  TRC:	  	  
223	  	   Mogale	  writes	  that	  reparations	  are	  “a	  fundamental	  human	  right”	  that	  has	  been	  denied	  by	  the	  South	  African	  government.224	  	  Regarding	  the	  TRC’s	  main	  recommendation	  of	  reparations	  for	  all	  apartheid	  victims,	  the	  government	  proved	  reluctant	  to	  repay	  them.	  	  21,000	  victims	  received	  some	  cash	  reparations	  from	  the	  government,	  but	  in	  a	  lesser	  amount	  than	  recommended	  by	  the	  TRC.225	  	  The	  government	  also	  refused	  to	  release	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  available	  for	  reparations,	  and	  the	  fight	  still	  continues	  today	  for	  better	  reparations	  to	  apartheid	  victims.	  	  Many	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  Gunnar	  Theissen,	  "Common	  Past,	  Divided	  Truth:	  The	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  in	  South	  African	  Public	  Opinion,”	  49.	  224	  Nthabiseng	  Mogale,	  "Ten	  Years	  of	  Democracy	  in	  South	  Africa:	  Revisiting	  the	  AZAPO	  Decision."	  In	  Law,	  Memory	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Apartheid:	  Ten	  Years	  after	  AZAPO	  v.	  President	  of	  South	  Africa	  (Cape	  Town:	  ABC	  Press,	  2007),	  148.	  225	  "Truth	  Commission:	  South	  Africa."	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace.	  Accessed	  March	  13,	  2015.	  	  
	  	   	   73	  	  argue	  that	  the	  economic	  inequality	  in	  the	  country	  cannot	  be	  rectified	  without	  these	  reparations.226	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  "Ten	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  of	  Democracy	  in	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  Africa:	  Revisiting	  the	  AZAPO	  Decision."	  In	  Law,	  Memory	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Apartheid:	  Ten	  Years	  after	  AZAPO	  v.	  President	  of	  South	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  (Cape	  Town:	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  Press,	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  "No	  Trial	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  Police	  in	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  Case."	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  October	  8,	  2003.	  Accessed	  December	  1,	  2014.	  http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/08/world/fg-­‐safrica8.	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CONCLUSION	  
Final	  Thoughts	  	   Anti-­‐apartheid	  activist	  Steve	  Biko	  has	  had	  an	  enduring	  legacy	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  Over	  20,000	  people	  attended	  his	  funeral,	  and	  his	  teachings	  on	  Black	  Consciousness	  survive	  to	  this	  day.228	  	  Although	  South	  Africa	  still	  has	  many	  social	  problems	  and	  is	  attempting	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  move	  forward	  from	  the	  still	  painful	  memory	  of	  apartheid,	  the	  country’s	  transition	  to	  democracy	  from	  minority	  rule	  under	  apartheid	  has	  been	  widely	  lauded	  and	  studied.	  	  After	  discussing	  the	  AZAPO	  court	  case	  and	  the	  subsequent	  TRC	  amnesty	  hearings,	  what	  impact	  did	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  case	  have	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa?	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  AZAPO	  case	  before	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  that	  challenged	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  amnesty	  provision	  of	  the	  Act,	  the	  Biko	  family’s	  wishes	  were	  denied	  as	  the	  court	  upheld	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  amnesty	  in	  the	  TRC.	  	  By	  denying	  an	  extremely	  high	  profile	  victim’s	  family	  its	  choice	  of	  prosecution	  for	  the	  officers	  involved	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Steve	  Biko	  (criminal	  justice),	  the	  Court	  showed	  that	  individual	  rights	  and	  wishes	  would	  be	  surrendered	  for	  the	  larger	  goals	  of	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  country.	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  for	  sure,	  but	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  this	  public	  and	  painful	  denial	  of	  the	  Biko	  family’s	  desire	  for	  justice	  through	  prosecution	  and	  the	  denial	  of	  amnesty	  deflated	  and	  discouraged	  other	  victims	  who	  had	  hope	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  cater	  to	  the	  needs	  and	  desires	  of	  victims	  over	  perpetrators.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  Andy	  Lines,	  "Steve	  Biko's	  Lover	  Mamphela	  Ramphele	  on	  the	  Tarnishing	  of	  His	  Legacy."	  Mirror.	  July	  7,	  2013.	  Accessed	  March	  13,	  2015.	  http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-­‐news/steve-­‐bikos-­‐lover-­‐mamphela-­‐ramphele-­‐2037279.	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   The	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case	  strengthened	  the	  new	  democratic	  government’s	  choice	  of	  transitional	  justice,	  although	  the	  Court	  ignored	  the	  plaintiffs’	  challenge	  on	  international	  law,	  which	  may	  have	  been	  the	  most	  solid	  argument	  in	  defense	  of	  the	  unconstitutionality	  of	  amnesty.	  	  However,	  since	  its	  inception,	  international	  law	  has	  been	  tricky,	  and	  it	  has	  often	  been	  implemented	  differently	  throughout	  the	  world,	  and	  it	  has	  very	  little	  real	  enforceability.	  	  However,	  critically,	  the	  Court	  was	  able	  to	  back	  up	  the	  new	  nation’s	  Interim	  Constitution,	  giving	  it	  the	  highest	  validity	  in	  the	  highest	  court	  of	  law.	  	  By	  proving	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  constitution,	  including	  its	  politically	  negotiated	  epilogue,	  the	  Court	  was	  then	  able	  to	  show	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  By	  being	  able	  to	  support	  both	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  Act	  against	  the	  high	  profile	  Biko	  family,	  the	  Court	  actually	  reinforced	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  and	  provided	  it	  with	  the	  strength	  to	  carry	  on.	  	  The	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case	  was	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  transition	  from	  apartheid,	  as	  it	  gave	  the	  highly	  contentious	  TRC	  some	  legitimacy	  and	  thus	  set	  South	  Africa	  on	  a	  unique	  and	  unprecedented	  path	  towards	  the	  current	  South	  Africa.	  	  Without	  this	  court	  decision	  and	  the	  upholding	  of	  amnesty,	  perhaps	  the	  threatening	  apartheid	  and	  Afrikaner	  factions	  would	  have	  resorted	  to	  violence,	  and	  the	  South	  Africa	  we	  know	  today	  that	  transitioned	  to	  democracy	  relatively	  peacefully	  would	  not	  exist.	  	  	  	   The	  five	  apartheid	  policemen	  applying	  for	  amnesty	  soon	  after	  the	  AZAPO	  decision	  for	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Biko	  was	  the	  next	  huge	  test	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  While	  the	  Biko	  family	  was	  denied	  its	  preferred	  form	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  AZAPO	  case,	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  was	  now	  under	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  intense	  international	  scrutiny.	  	  Many	  were	  afraid	  that	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  would	  provide	  a	  blanket	  amnesty	  to	  apartheid	  human	  rights	  violators	  and	  that	  justice	  would	  not	  be	  served.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Biko,	  the	  five	  officers	  were	  compelled	  to	  divulge	  important	  information	  that	  would	  arguably	  have	  never	  been	  shared	  if	  not	  for	  the	  chance	  of	  amnesty.	  	  While	  some	  may	  argue	  that	  any	  perpetrators	  motivated	  by	  amnesty	  to	  testify	  could	  not	  be	  trusted	  to	  share	  the	  truth,	  the	  hearings	  provided	  more	  of	  a	  picture	  of	  Biko’s	  last	  days	  and	  treatment	  under	  apartheid	  police	  custody.	  	  While	  the	  “whole	  truth”	  remains	  elusive,	  the	  five	  officers’	  testimonies,	  no	  matter	  what	  their	  motivation,	  at	  least	  provided	  some	  extra	  element	  of	  truth	  to	  the	  public	  and	  the	  Biko	  family.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  provided	  at	  least	  some	  justice	  by	  denying	  amnesty	  to	  all	  of	  the	  applicants	  regarding	  the	  death	  of	  Biko,	  as	  the	  Committee	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  they	  had	  shared	  the	  full	  truth	  and	  they	  had	  not	  shown	  that	  they	  were	  politically	  motivated	  in	  the	  murder	  of	  Biko.	  	  These	  five	  denials	  of	  amnesty	  quelled	  the	  public’s	  fear	  of	  the	  Amnesty	  Committee	  providing	  a	  blanket	  amnesty	  to	  anyone	  who	  applied,	  and	  actually	  showed	  how	  difficult	  it	  was	  to	  obtain	  amnesty.	  	  Conditions	  had	  to	  be	  met,	  which	  gave	  the	  amnesty	  process	  some	  legitimacy.	  	  While	  indeed	  there	  was	  no	  criminal,	  retributive	  justice	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  amnesty	  hearings,	  the	  five	  policemen	  were	  compelled	  to	  testify	  publicly	  and	  their	  names	  are	  now	  forever	  tied	  to	  the	  murder	  of	  Biko.	  	  The	  hearings	  uncovered	  some	  truth	  about	  the	  treatment	  of	  Biko	  in	  police	  custody,	  yet	  much	  is	  still	  unclear.	  	  However,	  the	  Biko	  family	  arguably	  found	  out	  more	  about	  Biko’s	  last	  days	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  hearings	  than	  they	  would	  have	  heard	  in	  a	  criminal	  proceeding.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  Chief	  Prosecutor	  later	  announced,	  there	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  was	  not	  enough	  direct	  evidence	  to	  even	  put	  these	  five	  apartheid	  police	  officers	  on	  trial.	  	  Even	  if	  South	  Africa’s	  statute	  of	  limitations	  had	  been	  extended	  to	  allow	  a	  prosecution	  to	  go	  forward	  regarding	  Biko’s	  death,	  the	  case	  was	  unfortunately	  unwinnable.	  	  	  	   The	  greatest	  failure	  in	  the	  truth	  versus	  justice	  debate	  surrounding	  this	  transition	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  reparations	  to	  victims	  of	  apartheid.	  	  The	  government	  knowingly	  decided	  to	  accept	  a	  tradeoff	  of	  justice	  for	  truth	  and	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  horrors	  of	  apartheid.	  	  Reparations,	  as	  called	  for	  in	  the	  TRC’s	  1998	  Final	  Report,	  would	  be	  the	  most	  just	  form	  of	  acknowledgment	  of	  past	  suffering	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  bringing	  the	  country	  forward.	  	  Many	  families	  left	  the	  TRC	  process	  with	  very	  little	  new	  truths	  and	  almost	  no	  justice,	  especially	  as	  amnesty	  was	  in	  fact	  granted	  to	  hundreds	  of	  human	  rights	  violators.	  	  Reparations	  would	  give	  all	  victims	  of	  apartheid	  the	  recognition	  and	  validation	  that	  perhaps	  the	  TRC	  could	  not	  provide	  to	  everyone,	  despite	  the	  Commission’s	  best	  efforts.	  	  	  	  	   While	  many	  people	  would	  probably	  prefer	  traditional	  criminal	  justice	  in	  the	  face	  of	  horrible	  human	  rights	  atrocities,	  the	  situation	  in	  South	  Africa	  was	  unique.	  	  Two	  opposing	  sides	  now	  had	  to	  work	  together	  for	  a	  new	  government,	  and	  there	  was	  an	  egregious	  lack	  of	  evidence	  to	  prosecute	  human	  rights	  abusers.	  	  And	  importantly,	  both	  sides	  in	  the	  apartheid	  struggle	  had	  committed	  crimes	  worthy	  of	  prosecution.	  	  But	  in	  this	  situation,	  where	  justice	  through	  criminal	  prosecutions	  was	  not	  guaranteed	  by	  any	  means,	  the	  TRC	  was	  arguably	  the	  best	  way	  to	  appease	  both	  sides	  enough	  to	  continue	  moving	  forward	  and	  to	  obtain,	  in	  some	  cases,	  at	  least	  more	  elements	  of	  the	  truth	  about	  what	  happened	  to	  many	  victims,	  many	  of	  whom	  lay	  in	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  unmarked	  graves	  and	  would	  not	  have	  been	  located	  without	  the	  truth-­‐telling	  of	  the	  TRC,	  which	  was	  motivated	  by	  amnesty.	  	  	  Thus,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  concrete	  data	  specifically	  linking	  the	  Biko	  case	  to	  public	  perceptions	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  process,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  AZAPO	  and	  the	  subsequent	  TRC	  amnesty	  hearings,	  arguing	  that	  this	  handling	  of	  the	  Biko	  case	  strengthened	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  The	  Biko	  case,	  through	  AZAPO	  and	  later	  the	  TRC,	  first	  provided	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  with	  legitimacy,	  legally	  defining	  reconciliation	  as	  a	  crucial	  goal	  of	  the	  new	  South	  Africa,	  and	  then	  showed	  that	  amnesty	  under	  the	  TRC	  was	  a	  difficult	  measure	  to	  obtain.	  	  The	  Biko	  family’s	  disillusionment	  and	  negative	  emotions	  regarding	  the	  lack	  of	  justice	  and	  full	  truth	  regarding	  Biko’s	  death	  are	  understandable	  and	  very	  unfortunate,	  yet	  Biko’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  high	  profile	  anti-­‐apartheid	  activist	  offered	  ideal	  ground	  to	  provide	  a	  sort	  of	  ethos	  to	  the	  reconciliation	  process.	  	  Steve	  Biko	  was	  not	  only	  a	  martyr	  for	  black	  South	  Africa	  and	  his	  cause	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  death,	  but	  he	  also	  became	  a	  martyr	  for	  the	  reconciliation	  process,	  providing	  it	  with	  the	  necessary	  authority	  to	  continue	  a	  relatively	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  democracy.	  	  
Biko’s	  Enduring	  Legacy	  
“Help	  to	  finish	  the	  work	  of	  Steve	  Biko.	  	  Help	  to	  smash	  the	  remaining	  links	  of	  the	  chains	  
he	  broke,	  and	  let	  the	  sound	  of	  this	  work	  echo	  around	  the	  world	  so	  that	  chains	  may	  be	  
broken	  wherever	  they	  hold	  in	  bondage	  the	  bodies	  and	  minds	  of	  men.”229	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐Donald	  Woods	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  Donald	  Woods,	  Biko.	  3rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1991),	  376.	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   Even	  though	  Steve	  Biko	  did	  not	  survive	  to	  see	  his	  country	  escape	  apartheid,	  he	  has	  a	  lasting	  legacy	  both	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Singer	  Peter	  Gabriel’s	  song	  Biko	  helped	  make	  Biko	  a	  world	  icon	  and	  household	  name	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  	  In	  1982,	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  Housing	  Association	  was	  founded	  in	  Liverpool,	  England	  to	  provide	  affordable	  housing	  primarily	  for	  black	  people	  and	  other	  ethnic	  minorities.230	  	  	  Many	  books	  and	  movies	  were	  produced	  around	  the	  world,	  including	  the	  critically	  acclaimed	  Cry	  Freedom	  in	  1987,	  starring	  Denzel	  Washington	  as	  Steve	  Biko	  and	  grossing	  more	  than	  $5	  million	  in	  the	  USA,	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  journalist	  Donald	  Woods	  and	  Steve	  Biko.231	  	  The	  film	  was	  nominated	  for	  three	  Academy	  Awards.232	  	  	  In	  1992,	  the	  Instituto	  Cultural	  Beneficente	  Steve	  Biko	  was	  founded	  in	  Salvador,	  Bahia,	  Brazil,	  which	  created	  the	  first	  pre-­‐university	  courses	  for	  black	  Brazilians.233	  	  The	  mission	  of	  the	  institute	  is	  to	  “promote	  political	  and	  social	  advancement	  of	  the	  black	  population	  through	  education	  and	  appreciation	  of	  their	  ancestry.”234	  	  The	  institute	  provides	  an	  education	  for	  many	  poor	  black	  Brazilians	  who	  otherwise	  would	  have	  to	  attend	  underfunded	  public	  schools	  with	  little	  chance	  of	  ever	  escaping	  the	  cycle	  of	  poverty.235	  	  	  In	  1997,	  President	  Nelson	  Mandela	  commemorated	  the	  twentieth	  anniversary	  of	  Biko’s	  death	  by	  unveiling	  a	  statue	  of	  Biko	  in	  his	  hometown	  of	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  Accessed	  March	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  Ibid. 233	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  Nos."	  Instituto	  Cultural	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  Accessed	  March	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  2015.	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   80	  	  Ginsberg,	  South	  Africa.	  	  He	  spoke	  about	  Biko’s	  impressive	  legacy	  and	  how	  to	  continue	  his	  work,	  stating:	  “In	  those	  difficult	  hours	  ten	  years	  ago,	  the	  slings	  and	  arrows	  of	  outrageous	  fortune	  robbed	  a	  nation	  of	  a	  gifted	  young	  man	  whose	  contribution	  to	  our	  cause	  would	  have	  been	  even	  more	  immense.	  	  But	  our	  commitment	  to	  the	  unity	  that	  Steve	  Biko	  stood	  for	  will	  continue	  to	  guide	  us	  as	  we	  join	  hands	  in	  practical	  action	  to	  redress	  the	  legacy	  of	  oppression.	  	  It	  means	  working	  together,	  government	  in	  each	  sphere	  and	  all	  sectors	  from	  society,	  in	  bringing	  prosperity	  to	  the	  province,	  the	  country	  and	  the	  continent,	  which	  spawned	  him.	  	  It	  means	  all	  of	  us	  helping	  to	  take	  South	  Africa	  across	  the	  threshold	  of	  greatness	  on	  which	  it	  stands.	  	  That	  will	  be	  achieved	  by	  each	  of	  us	  respecting	  ourselves	  first	  and	  foremost,	  and	  in	  turn	  respecting	  the	  humanity	  in	  each	  one	  of	  us.	  	  It	  means	  an	  attitude	  of	  mind	  and	  a	  way	  of	  life	  that	  appreciates	  the	  joy	  in	  the	  honest	  labour	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  society.	  In	  time,	  we	  must	  bestow	  on	  South	  Africa	  the	  greatest	  gift	  -­‐	  a	  more	  humane	  society.”236	  At	  this	  address,	  Mandela	  also	  renamed	  a	  bridge	  to	  the	  town	  and	  made	  Biko’s	  childhood	  home	  a	  national	  monument.	  	  Mandela	  stated	  that	  all	  of	  these	  actions	  were	  made	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  “immortalise”	  Biko’s	  life.237	  	  This	  Steve	  Biko	  Memorial	  still	  stands	  in	  Ginsberg	  and	  is	  a	  leading	  tourist	  attraction	  in	  the	  area.238	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   81	  	  	   In	  1998,	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  Foundation	  was	  created	  to	  continue	  the	  work	  of	  Biko	  with	  the	  central	  mission	  of	  “restoring	  people	  to	  their	  true	  humanity.”239	  	  The	  Foundation	  works	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town	  on	  the	  Steve	  Biko	  Memorial	  Lectures,	  where	  each	  year	  a	  keynote	  speaker	  presents	  on	  a	  subject	  related	  to	  the	  activism	  of	  Steve	  Biko.	  	  Past	  speakers	  have	  included	  the	  former	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Navi	  Pillay,	  Biko	  family	  attorney	  Sir	  Sydney	  Kentridge,	  TRC	  Commissioner	  Archbishop	  Desmond	  Tutu,	  President	  Thabo	  Mbeki,	  and	  American	  professor	  Alice	  Walker.240	  	  	   Evidence	  of	  Biko’s	  lasting	  legacy	  also	  lies	  with	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  AZAPO	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  The	  group	  still	  operates	  on	  Biko’s	  Black	  Consciousness	  ideals,	  but	  now	  has	  more	  of	  a	  political	  wing	  that	  is	  pushing	  for	  the	  political	  incorporation	  of	  the	  black	  working	  class.241	  	  On	  a	  broader	  level,	  Biko’s	  intellectual	  and	  philosophical	  Black	  Consciousness	  Movement	  is	  still	  studied	  and	  referenced	  today	  internationally.	  	  	   Most	  recently,	  in	  2013,	  Biko’s	  former	  lover	  Mamphela	  Ramphele	  founded	  the	  AGANG	  political	  party	  in	  South	  Africa	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  “stay	  true	  to	  the	  blood	  of	  young	  and	  not	  very	  young	  martyrs”	  during	  the	  anti-­‐apartheid	  struggle.242	  	  She	  hopes	  to	  improve	  education,	  improve	  health	  care,	  prevent	  maternal	  death,	  and	  above	  all	  to	  increase	  morality	  in	  South	  Africa.243	  	  Her	  and	  Biko’s	  son	  Hlumelo	  commented	  that	  Biko	  would	  “not	  be	  happy”	  with	  the	  current	  state	  of	  South	  Africa,	  which	  is	  still	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   82	  	  reeling	  from	  the	  long-­‐term	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  apartheid.244	  	  Ramphele	  vows	  to	  build	  on	  Biko’s	  legacy,	  as	  she	  feels	  South	  Africa	  under	  the	  ANC	  has	  taken	  several	  steps	  backward.245	  	  In	  the	  2014	  national	  elections,	  the	  AGANG	  party	  gained	  only	  0.28%	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  two	  seats	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.246	  	  Following	  internal	  struggles	  in	  the	  party,	  Ramphele	  stepped	  down	  for	  the	  party’s	  leadership	  in	  July	  2014	  and	  announced	  that	  she	  would	  increase	  her	  activism	  in	  civil	  society	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  young	  people	  and	  women	  to	  ensure	  a	  better	  South	  Africa.247	  	  	  	   All	  of	  the	  above	  examples	  show	  that	  Stephen	  Bantu	  Biko	  did	  not	  die	  in	  vain.	  	  The	  South	  Africa	  we	  know	  today,	  an	  example	  of	  a	  relatively	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  democracy,	  would	  arguably	  not	  exist	  without	  his	  role	  in	  fighting	  apartheid,	  and	  later,	  in	  death,	  helping	  to	  give	  legitimacy	  to	  a	  revolutionary	  transitional	  process.	  	  He	  was	  a	  martyr	  twice	  over	  for	  his	  country,	  and	  his	  legacy	  will	  continue	  to	  empower	  others	  around	  the	  world	  and	  especially	  in	  South	  Africa,	  where	  there	  is	  still	  much	  work	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  path	  to	  equality.	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